



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE INSTRUMENT-ELEMENT MODEL:
A GRAND-STRATEGIC MODEL FOR WAR**

by

Ian Russell Nesbitt

September 2005

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Daniel J. Moran
James A. Russell

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 2005	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Instrument-Element Model: A Grand-Strategic Model for War			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Ian Russell Nesbitt				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>This thesis develops a model for understanding and conducting war at the level of grand strategy. Grand strategy seeks the seamless integration of all aspects of national power to achieve a desired policy goal. The model is named the "Instrument-Element Model" because it focuses on the essential elements which underlie the instruments of power by which belligerents contend with each other.</p> <p>Each belligerent is modeled by three elements: the people, the government and the military. Belligerents affect each other using the instruments of national power: diplomacy, information, military force, economic leverage, and this thesis argues, ethical principles. This thesis argues that successful grand strategies can focus on the people, the government or the military.</p> <p>The Instrument-Element Model is tested and illustrated by an analysis of three wars in which a successful grand strategy focused on each of the three elements: the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (focusing on the Military), the 1999 Kosovo War (focusing on the Government) and the Algerian Revolution (focusing on the People). This thesis also considers how to apply the Instrument-Model to terrorist and insurgent groups, and concludes with three recommendations to help our Republic think, fight and win grand-strategically.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Grand Strategy, National Strategy, National Security Strategy, Military Strategy, Grand-strategic warfare, Grand strategic warfare, Strategic Warfare, Levels of Warfare, Levels of War, Grand-strategic level of war, Grand strategic level of war, Policy level of war, Instruments of National Power, Instruments of Power, Ethical Power, Ethical Principles, Models of War, Models of Warfare, Mental Models, Mental Vocabulary, Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency, Terrorism Campaign, Counter-Terrorism, Terrorism, Kosovo, Kosovo Air War, Kosovo War, 1999 Kosovo War, NATO, Operation Allied Force, Algeria, Algerian Revolution, French-Algerian War, 1967 War, Arab-Israeli War, The Six Day War, Coercive Diplomacy, Integrated War, Instrument-Element Model, Five Ring Model, B. H. Liddell Hart, Colonel John A. Warden			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 95	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**THE INSTRUMENT-ELEMENT MODEL:
A GRAND-STRATEGIC MODEL FOR WAR**

Ian R. Nesbitt
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2005**

Author: Ian Russell Nesbitt

Approved by: Professor Daniel J. Moran
Thesis Advisor

Professor James A. Russell
Second Reader

Professor Douglas D. Porch
Chairman, National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis develops a model for understanding and conducting war at the level of grand strategy. Grand strategy seeks the seamless integration of all aspects of national power to achieve a desired policy goal. The model is named the “Instrument-Element Model” because it focuses on the essential elements which underlie the instruments of power by which belligerents contend with each other.

Each belligerent is modeled by three elements: the people, the government and the military. Belligerents affect each other using the instruments of national power: diplomacy, information, military force, economic leverage, and this thesis argues, ethical principles. This thesis argues that successful grand strategies can focus on the people, the government or the military.

The Instrument-Element Model is tested and illustrated by an analysis of three wars in which a successful grand strategy focused on each of the three elements: the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (focusing on the Military), the 1999 Kosovo War (focusing on the Government) and the Algerian Revolution (focusing on the People). This thesis also considers how to apply the Instrument-Model to terrorist and insurgent groups, and concludes with three recommendations to help our Republic think, fight and win grand-strategically.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	MODELS AND THE INSTRUMENT-ELEMENT GRAND-STRATEGIC MODEL FOR WAR	1
A.	WHAT DO MODELS DO?.....	2
B.	AN EXAMPLE OF A USEFUL, NON-SYMMETRIC, DETERMINISTIC MODEL	4
C.	THE INSTRUMENT-ELEMENT MODEL FOR WAR	6
	1. Describing Belligerents in Terms of Component Elements	6
	a. <i>The Three Elements of the Organic System</i>	7
	b. <i>The Three Inter-Element Connections</i>	7
	2. Describing How Belligerents Affect Each Other.....	8
	a. <i>The Four Instruments of National Power, as Currently Recognized</i>.....	8
	3. Accounting for the Variability in Wars' Importance and the Passions	10
D.	SUMMARY	12
II.	FOCUSING ON THE MILITARY: THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR	13
A.	CONTOURS OF ACTION	14
B.	ANALYSIS OF GRAND STRATEGY	18
C.	INTER-CONNECTIONS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS.....	20
D.	ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT'S LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND PASSION.....	22
E.	COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS	24
F.	FINAL THOUGHTS	25
III.	FOCUSING ON THE GOVERNMENT: THE 1999 KOSOVO WAR	29
A.	CONTOURS OF ACTION	30
B.	ANALYSIS OF GRAND STRATEGY	36
C.	INTER-CONNECTIONS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS.....	39
D.	ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT'S LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND PASSION.....	42
E.	COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS	43
F.	FINAL THOUGHTS	44
IV.	FOCUSING ON THE PEOPLE: THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION	47
A.	CONTOURS OF ACTION	47
B.	ANALYSIS OF GRAND STRATEGY	52
C.	INTER-CONNECTIONS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS.....	54
D.	ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT'S LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND PASSION.....	57
E.	COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS	59
F.	FINAL THOUGHTS	60

V.	CONCLUSION	63
A.	CONCLUSIONS	63
B.	AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	66
	1. Develop Additional Case Studies Involving Unconventional Belligerents	66
	2. Develop Case Studies Where Non-Military Instruments of Power Play a Predominant Role	66
	3. Further Refine the Instrument-Element Model	66
C.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	68
	1. Formally Recognize the Grand-Strategic Level of War.....	68
	2. Formally Recognize National Policy as a Level of War	70
	3. Formally Recognize Ethical Power as an Instrument of National Power	71
D.	DROPPING ANCHOR	73
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	75
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	79

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	A Model's Effects on Observation.	3
Figure 2.	Colonel John Warden's Five Ring Model.	5
Figure 3.	The Organic System.....	7
Figure 4.	The Instrument-Element Model.	9
Figure 5.	A Depiction of the Belligerents' Grand Strategies.	20
Figure 6.	A Summary of the Inter-Element Connections.....	22
Figure 7.	A Depiction of the Belligerents' Grand Strategies.	39
Figure 8.	A Summary of the Inter-Element Connections.....	41
Figure 9.	A Depiction of the Belligerents' Grand Strategies.	54
Figure 10.	A Summary of the Inter-Element Connections.....	57
Figure 11.	The Five Levels of War.	71

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	The Seven Defined Levels for a Conflict's Importance.	11
Table 2.	Ethical Actions and Their Likely Effects.....	72

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Katherine and our son Caelan. Thank you Kate and thank you Caelan, for your patience and understanding. This has not been easy for any of us. To Kate I offer a special thank you for your tremendous assistance, encouragement and support.

I would also like to thank my thesis advisor, Daniel Moran, for his exceptional support, dedication and scholarly mentorship. Thank you to my second reader, James Russell, for his insightful critiques and for showing me where this thesis' ideas can take me in the future. Thank you to Captain Terry Pierce, U.S. Navy (retired), a true warrior-scholar, whose inspirational leadership showed me an entirely new path in the Navy. Thank you to Commander Mike McMaster, U.S. Navy (retired) who let me run with this idea in the first place. Thank you to then Midshipman Third Class John P. McShane who gave me my copy of B. H. Liddell Hart's *Strategy* in the summer of 1994, starting me down this path. And finally, thank you to B. H. Liddell Hart himself for pointing out the *terra incognita* to be charted.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. MODELS AND THE INSTRUMENT-ELEMENT GRAND-STRATEGIC MODEL FOR WAR

This thesis develops a model for understanding and conducting war at the level of grand strategy.¹ It is named the “Instrument-Element Model” because it focuses on the elements which comprise belligerents and the instruments of power they use to affect each other. Most military and political leaders recognize that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” and understand the need for a strong connection between the use of force and policy goals.² Less clear may be the role of non-military power in war. At times non-military power has been described as supporting the military effort, or it may be omitted from the analysis altogether. Such characterizations of the utility and effects of non-military power are regrettable. One person who understood the importance of full integration between military and non-military power was Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895-1970), a British military officer and theorist. In his book *Strategy*, Hart refers to the integration of national power to realize policy as grand strategy, which he describes as “the [coordination] and [direction of] all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war- the goal defined by fundamental policy.”³ Policy and grand strategy are distinct from each other, as grand strategy supports the realization of policy (a group’s desires or goals). Grand strategy forms both: the integrated plan to realize policy, and coordinates the “policy in execution” as the plan unfolds.⁴

If grand strategy is “policy in execution,” why develop a model of how it works in war? There are two reasons. First, analyzing past conflicts using the Instrument-Element Model will help determine critical interactions that led to victory or defeat which could assist in planning and executing current and future wars. Second, a useful model could help elevate the study of grand strategy for military professionals, the academic

¹ Military commanders and policy makers will be referred to collectively as leaders. They will be identified separately when necessary to distinguish between them.

² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.

³ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy 2nd revised edition* (London, Meridian, Published by the Penguin Group, 1991), 322.

⁴ Hart, 322.

community, and policy makers. In 1967 B. H. Liddell Hart wrote “the sorry state of peace – for both sides, that has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part *terra incognita* – still awaiting exploration, and understanding.”⁵ This thesis attempts to chart that unknown territory.

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I discusses the need for, and then develops a model for war at the level of grand strategy. Chapters II-IV are case studies of wars analyzed using the Instrument-Element Model. The three wars are: the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1999 Kosovo War between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) and the 1954-62 Algerian Revolution. Chapter V contains conclusions based on the analysis in Chapters II-IV, avenues for future research and recommendations to help our Republic think, fight and win grand-strategically.

A. WHAT DO MODELS DO?

A model, as a framework, helps refine observations, assimilate new data, shape decisions and define actions.⁶ It helps define a person’s mental vocabulary. A given model may be helpful or not depending on the fit between the model and the situation. If a person’s vocabulary doesn’t encompass a given situation, responding to it will be much more difficult. By design, all models serve as filters and lenses. Good models help organize chaotic information into understandable structure. As filters, models can summarily reject, what the model considers, unimportant information. As lenses, models alter information. When beneficial, the lens brings new information into a focus. When harmful a model takes needed information and blurs it. A good model should recognize as many inputs as practical, to limit the chance of being stunned by an unfamiliar input.⁷ A depiction of how models effect information is shown in Figure 1.

⁵ Hart, 322.

⁶ Readers will likely be familiar with these four stages as U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd’s OODA loop, which he defines as: Observation, Orientation, Decision making and Action. Individuals, or groups, are conceived as moving through the OODA loop as they receive and process new information. See: Robert Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1991), 51 as well as William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Bolder: Westview Press, 1985), 4-6.

⁷ An excess of inputs being observed and considered can slow down an entire model, limiting its effectiveness. The danger of being stunned by an unfamiliar grand-strategic input can be so great however, that a stunned belligerent can lose a war before it can recover.




Figure 1. A Model's Effects on Observation.

Models are used consciously or subconsciously, and may be formally defined or informal guidelines. As grand strategy is largely *terra incognita*, most models about it are subconscious and informal. Leaders are left to develop hunches about how war works grand-strategically. This thesis seeks to develop an explicit model, which will, at a minimum, allow unspoken assumptions to be clarified and tested.

A good grand-strategic model should be symmetric, meaning it would encompass all belligerents, by accounting for how they seek to influence, *and for how they are influenced by*, each other. Many models of warfare, particularly at the operational level, only account for how one belligerent affects its adversary.⁸ Grand-strategically, a non-symmetric model can leave the user paying greater attention to one's own plan, and losing sight of the enemy's actions. A useful grand-strategic model would also be non-deterministic, meaning it would not emphasize one style of warfare over others. When looking at war grand-strategically, one sees countless ways belligerents have sought to

affect each other. A useful grand-strategic model must encompass as much of this wide

⁸ The operational level of warfare is the linkage between tactical action and the overall military campaign. As defined in current U.S. military doctrine, there are three levels of war: the strategic, the operational and the tactical. See: *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, (Washington, D.C., The Joint Staff, 10 September 2001), II-2.

variation of form as possible, otherwise users could be stunned by unfamiliar actions, that may not even be recognized.

B. AN EXAMPLE OF A USEFUL, NON-SYMMETRIC, DETERMINISTIC MODEL

Looking at a useful, non-symmetric, deterministic model helps understand why, at the grand-strategic level, symmetry and non-determinism are so important. Of current military models of warfare, few are more esteemed than Colonel John A. Warden III's "Five Ring Model." As one of the lead Air Force planners who developed Operation Desert Storm's air campaign, he used his model to determine and prioritize the types of targets to attack. In his seminal paper, "The Enemy as a System," Colonel Warden described the enemy as a system comprising five elements: leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population and fielded military forces.⁹ Warden designed his model to apply to a "strategic entity" which he described as a group able to "function on its own and is free and able to make decisions as to where it will go and what it will do."¹⁰ He envisioned the Five Ring Model as applying to such diverse groups as the human body, a nation state, a drug cartel or an electric grid.¹¹ Warden saw the Five Rings as a series of concentric circles, with leadership in the center (see Figure 2).

⁹ Colonel John A. Warden III, U.S. Air Force, "The Enemy as a System," *Airpower Journal* 9, 2 (Spring, 1995), 3. Available online at: <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/warden.html>. Accessed 9 SEP 05.

¹⁰ Warden, "The Enemy as a System," 3.

¹¹ Warden, "The Enemy as a System," 3.




Figure 2. Colonel John Warden's Five Ring Model.

The Five Ring Model describes each successive layer of the enemy system, moving out from the center, as possessing a greater numbers of less important targets, except the fielded military. Deployed military forces offer fewer targets than the population and they may be able to defend themselves. The model concludes that the leadership ring is the most important because it guides the entire enemy system. Warden believed that with the leadership neutralized, strategic paralysis sets in and the enemy becomes inert.¹² When using the Five Ring model, airpower is the preeminent tool of force. Early in a conflict, it alone can target the leadership ring directly. A small flight of bombers with precision munitions can attack the leadership ring's few critical targets, either destroying the leadership outright or rendering it paralyzed. Warden's model exemplifies theoretical determinism. Regardless of the variety of military forces a nation may have, the Five Ring Model ensures that airpower is the weapon of choice and that it should be used to attack leadership targets, while fielded forces are disregarded or marginalized as targets.

The Five Ring Model's nature does not easily lend itself to symmetrical application for two or more adversaries in conflict. As a model, it assumes the user has the potential to gain air superiority and striking forces to exploit it. Since World War Two, there have been few wars where both belligerents had sufficient airpower and been

¹² Warden, "The Enemy as a System," 3.

within range of each other.¹³ In most cases, only one adversary (or neither) has had any hope of gaining air superiority and then striking the enemy's leadership ring. Within the overall domain of war however, Warden's Five Ring Model plays an important role. It remains a key aid when developing an air campaign for commanders with overwhelming airpower. Leaders must be careful when using a non-symmetric model beyond its relevant domain however, as it can lead to overlooking the enemy's actions.

C. THE INSTRUMENT-ELEMENT MODEL FOR WAR

The Instrument-Element Model develops in three stages. First, individual belligerents are described. Second, the way belligerents interact with each other is modeled, also included are the effects of the international system (for example: the UN, or a separate major nation). Finally the variability of war's importance and the passions, the degree to which belligerent's yearn for war, are discussed. Like Warden's Five Ring Model, the Instrument-Element Model is intended to model "strategic entities," those groups able to "function on [their] own and... free and able to make decisions as to where it will go and what it will do."¹⁴ States as "strategic entities" will be used while developing the Instrument-Element Model. Afterwards the applicability of the Instrument-Element Model for unconventional belligerents will be discussed.

1. Describing Belligerents in Terms of Component Elements

Belligerents are represented by three main elements: the people, the government and the military.¹⁵ The three elements are important in themselves, as are the connections between them, i.e. the way each element affects the other two. Strong inter-element connections can help maintain group cohesion and unity of purpose. The three elements and the three connections together form an *organic system*, meaning the three elements and three connections are all interrelated. Depending on the belligerent, change in one part of the organic system may affect, at times drastically, an interrelated part.

¹³ The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war is a notable exception, where both adversaries had air forces that could, at least theoretically, gain air superiority and exploit it by attacking leadership targets.

¹⁴ Warden, "The Enemy as a System," 3.

¹⁵ The names of the three elements come from their roles within states; however parallel roles of leadership, fighters and supporters exist within insurgent forces and terrorist groups.

a. *The Three Elements of the Organic System*

1. People
2. Government
3. Military

b. *The Three Inter-Element Connections*

1. Military - Government (M-G)
2. Government - People (G-P)
3. People - Military (P-M)

The three elements and three inter-element connections form one organic system which describes an individual belligerent and is depicted as Figure 3.




Figure 3. The Organic System.

2. Describing How Belligerents Affect Each Other

Belligerents affect each other with the four instruments of national power, defined in *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1*.

a. *The Four Instruments of National Power, as Currently Recognized*

1. Diplomatic
2. Economic
3. Informational
4. Military force.¹⁶

Each instrument of national power can interact with any of the three elements and part of determining a successful grand strategy is determining which instruments would best influence a given element. Some instrument-to-element interactions (like using military force on unarmed, non-combatant civilians) may be illegal or immoral, but are still included in the model because such acts occur in war. Being able to map every belligerent's possible actions is part of creating a symmetric model.

The belligerents' organic systems and the instruments of national power form a symmetric system that allows for a diverse set of interactions. The international system is added, which together forms one superordinate system, the Instrument-Element Model.¹⁷ The international system receives inputs from, and can affect, each belligerent. Including the international system helps leaders consider how their actions will affect allies, important non-governmental organizations like the UN or the Red Cross, major media agencies and more, as well as the effects these important external entities will have on the war. Figure 4 depicts the Instrument-Element Model, complete with two organic systems, the four instruments of national power (notionally directed at each element) and the international system.

¹⁶ *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1*, (Washington, D.C., The Joint Staff, 14 November 2000), I-6. This thesis describes the military instrument of national power as military force to emphasize the use of combat, in line with the intent of Joint Publication 1. Military units engaged in non-combat missions fall under the diplomatic, economic or informational instruments of national power.

¹⁷ Superordinate: meaning "superior in rank, the opposite of subordinate," *The Compact Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition* (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1991), 1966.




Figure 4. The Instrument-Element Model.

Figure 4 depicts two belligerents in conflict, but the Instrument-Element Model can be applied to more complex cases. If allies are operating independently they can and should be modeled with their own organic systems. Allies operating in close harmony can be depicted with one organic system if it simplifies analysis. This thesis considers an example of allies operating independently as well as a fairly cohesive alliance.

The Instrument-Element Model is symmetric because it actively includes both belligerents, and non-deterministic, because no instrument of national power is predominant over the others. Historian Paul Kennedy put it well when he wrote: “Grand Strategy in war is... necessarily more military than it is in peace.”¹⁸ A state of war implies, and to some degree requires, organized fighting. Thus during the active period of a war, military force will likely play a large role, but the model itself does not require

¹⁸ Paul Kennedy et al., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. by Paul Kennedy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 169.

it. Theorists have argued eternally as to whether a war can be won without fighting, but if it could, it would mean using the three non-military instruments of national power against the adversary's three elements.¹⁹ The Instrument-Element Model seeks to encompass the widest variety of war's forms, and could certainly describe a predominantly non-military confrontation between adversaries.

The Instrument-Element Model asks leaders to consider fundamental questions like how to best affect the enemy and defend against the enemy's grand-strategic attacks. Considering the enemy's offensive grand strategy is particularly important for larger nations when they war with smaller nations (or groups). Leaders of larger nations may not consider that their enemy is working; not only to resist their actions, but also to conduct its own offensive grand strategy, a situation described in one of the case studies.

3. Accounting for the Variability in Wars' Importance and the Passions

The Instrument-Element Model also considers how each belligerent values the underlying conflict's importance. The degree that elements need to be degraded before victory/defeat occurs depends on how important the effected adversary views the conflict. This thesis defines seven levels of importance: critical, vital, major, significant, moderate, minor, and negligible.

Conflicts of critical importance definitely lead to war and continue house-to-house until the last person is killed or captured. Such wars are rare but occur when the loser believes his society will be exterminated by the victor. Conflicts of vital importance lead to war and will likely continue until one belligerent cannot continue. The military, government, or society will be wrecked. Conflicts of major importance will likely lead to wars of choice. The decision to go to war may seem fairly clear cut. The war will continue for quite some time, however defeat can occur if the war lasts too long or the costs and acceleration of costs rise too quickly.²⁰ Conflicts of significant importance may lead to wars of choice, and end more quickly than major wars. Significant importance generally represents the lowest level of importance that

¹⁹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971), 77.

²⁰ The idea of how the acceleration of costs affects war was brought to my attention by Dr. Scott Sigmund Gartner. Dr. Scott Sigmund Gartner, Lectures: "*Strategic Assessment in War*" and "*How Measuring Success in War Leads to Failure*." Naval Postgraduate School, August, 26, 2005.

belligerents will willingly go to war over. Issues of moderate importance are normally handled with non-military means. Although coercive diplomacy may be used, the intent is to keep differences from escalating into war. The economic instrument may be the lead instrument, with sanctions and embargos used (for example). Minor issues are traditionally handled with diplomacy and information. Negligible issues require no action, and are mentioned for completeness of the levels of importance.

Level of Importance	Willing to Fight A War?	Likely Characterization
Critical	Definitely	Absolute War
Vital	Yes	Total War
Major	Likely	War of Choice –High Order
Significant	Perhaps	War of Choice–Low Order
Moderate	Unlikely	Coercive Diplomacy
Minor	No	Diplomacy
Negligible	No	No action

Table 1. The Seven Defined Levels for a Conflict’s Importance.

The Instrument-Element Model also considers inflammation of the passions, wherein the people, the military and/or the government clamor for war.²¹ Recognizing this hunger for war is important because people who are stirred up about a conflict may be more likely to support it despite setbacks. Additionally, when the passions are inflamed, a government’s options may be constrained. Facing high domestic costs (like being voted out of office or deposed by a coup), governments may be unwilling submit to coercive pressures.²²

The Instrument-Element Model applies to non-state actors. One of the case studies describes the grand strategy of a terrorist-insurgent group. When the belligerents are states, identifying their elements is often easy. For non-state actors, identifying the

²¹ Colonel Harry G, Summers Jr., U.S. Army, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1982), 35. See also: Clausewitz, 89.

²² The constriction of a government’s options appears to have occurred in all three case studies presented.

elements may prove difficult. Recognizing differences with formal states, insurgencies and terrorist groups must have some mix of leaders, fighters and supporters if they are to operate independently.²³ For non-state actors, group leaders are akin to the government, supporters are the people, and their fighters should be considered the military. Recognizing that unconventional belligerents have the three elements means they also have three inter-element connections. Their inter-element connections need cohesiveness, just as for states. Independent non-state actors like insurgency groups and terrorist organizations, as “strategic entities,” can therefore be described as organic systems and do fit within the Instrument-Element Model.

D. SUMMARY

A symmetric and non-deterministic model has been created. The people, government and military, the four instruments of national power and the international system have been linked into a superordinate system. Consideration is given to the importance each belligerent places in the war and the degree to which passions are inflamed. **Wars of greater importance will likely require complete neutralization of an element. Conflicts of lesser importance can be won/lost with a proportionally smaller effect on the elements. Neutralization of an element is important to emphasize, as the outright destruction of an element is not necessary to secure an opponent’s defeat.** Governments may chose to abandon war aims before being totally destroyed or military forces may stop fighting if they no longer believe in a war’s goals or methods. In Chapters II-IV, the Instrument-Element Model analyzes each of the three case studies. Conclusions, recommendations and avenues for future study are discussed in Chapter V.

²³ For immature terrorist or insurgent groups, some members may have dual roles. The idea of maturity and the development of terrorist and insurgent groups was first brought to my attention by Major William D. Casebeer, U.S. Air Force, Ph.D.

II. FOCUSING ON THE MILITARY: THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Israel's grand strategy in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War focused almost exclusively on destroying the enemy's deployed military. Israel sought decisive victory over the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian military forces; to end the military threat. In doing so, Israel was able to greatly improve its geo-strategic situation, through territorial enlargement and reduction of its border's length (both of which were important Israeli issues prior to the war).²⁴ In addition, Israel wanted to open the Strait of Tiran, which Egypt closed to Israeli shipping May 22nd, 1967.

This chapter begins with the contours of action. With a brief outline of the conflict established, four aspects of the war will be considered. They are: an analysis of Israel's grand strategy, the inter-connections between the three elements of each belligerent's organic system, the degree to which the passions were inflamed, and the conflict's importance as seen from each belligerent's point of view. Limitations of this chapter's analysis will be discussed.

By late May of 1967, much of Israel, Syria and Egypt had come to believe that war was not only likely but imminent. People openly talked about the upcoming war, wondering what form it would take.²⁵ Egypt had asked the UN observers in the Sinai to depart, mobilized its Army and eventually positioned over two hundred thousand soldiers along the Israeli border.²⁶ On the 22nd of May, Egypt closed the strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, itself an act of war.²⁷ President Nasser's rhetoric called for the destruction of Israel and driving the Jews to the sea declaring "the Arab people want to fight."²⁸ By late May, people throughout Israel were saying "*T'Hiyeh milchamah* - there will be war."²⁹

²⁴ Daniel Moran, *Wars of National Liberation* (London, Cassell, 2001) 184.

²⁵ Eric Hammel, *Six Days in June: how Israel won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), xv.

²⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Art of Operations*, (Lanham, University Press of America, 1987), 26.

²⁷ Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli wars: War and Peace in the Middle East* (New York, Random House, 1982), 149.

²⁸ A. J. Barker, *Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York, Hippocrene Books, 1981), 41.

²⁸ Barker, 44.

²⁹ Hammel, 1.

A. CONTOURS OF ACTION

The 1967 War can be understood as having resulted from feelings of Arab embarrassment following the 1948 and 1956 Wars. Seen in this manner, the Arab states were looking to ‘cleanse the stain on their honor that was Israel’ once and for all. Certainly antagonistic rhetoric, particularly Egyptian, started as early as 1956 with Nasser’s “hate Israel” campaign.³⁰ Another argument can be made that neither the Arabs nor Israelis truly wanted war in 1967, yet both sides backed into positions they felt they could not modify or abandon and war resulted.

The conflict began April 7, 1967 when Syria shelled Israeli farmers working in border settlements.³¹ Although Syria had sporadically shelled northern Israel since 1956, the intensity of artillery shelling increased through March and into April, 1967. Fed up with the increased attacks, on April 7th Israel responded dramatically: first by machine gunning the Syrian positions, then bringing in tanks, and eventually the Israeli Air Force to destroy Syrian artillery pieces. Syrian fighters responded and in a series of dogfights six Syrian MiGs were shot down.³² After destroying the Syrian fighters, “some of the Israeli Mirages then flew on the 50 or so miles to Damascus to demonstrate their superiority in Syria’s air space.”³³ After the air battle, Israeli Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Yitzhak Rabin raised the rhetorical pressure when he issued

a stern warning to the Syrian Government, indicating that Israel would not remain passive in the face of the Syrian attacks and provocations, and that, should activity on the part of the Syrians continue, Israeli reaction would be such as to endanger the very existence of the regime in Damascus.³⁴

At the time Syria and Egypt enjoyed close diplomatic relations, and Egypt re-pledged its support to Syria against Israeli aggression. This close support was a legacy of Syria and Egypt’s political union that formed the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) from 1958 to 1961. Even after the breakup, Nasser continued to refer to Egypt as the U.A.R.

³⁰ Barker, 41.

³¹ Barker, 41.

³² Herzog, 148.

³³ Barker, 41.

³⁴ Herzog, 148.

The Soviet Union threw an unexpected wrench into the crisis May 13th, when it told Egypt that Israel intended to invade Syria with “11 to 13” brigades on the Syrian border. Israel’s attempt to bring the Russian ambassador to Israel on a fact finding tour of Northern Israel would have shown that there were no invasion preparations. The Ambassador declined. Despite UN Secretary General U Thant’s May 19th statement that Israel had not massed an invasion force along Syria’s border, the damage was done. Nasser was convinced Israel intended to invade.³⁵

In May of 1967, President Nasser “was at one of the low points of his career. For five years, his forces had been involved in the civil war in the Yemen without success against ill-armed tribesmen.”³⁶ Nasser needed something to turn around his low standing. Inflammatory speeches against Israel proved just the answer. Nasser dramatically increased the rhetorical invective during a “Palestine Day” rally of Arab students. The May 14th date of the rally was especially symbolic, because on that day in 1948 Israel declared its independence, yet Egypt celebrated May 14th as “Palestine Day,” a day when Nasser expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people and denounced the existence of Israel. Throughout the Arab world, people celebrated Nasser’s speech with what bordered on hysteria. Arab state after Arab state pledged support for the forthcoming war against Israel, including Iraq which quickly dispatched a division of soldiers to Jordan.³⁷

Action followed rhetoric when on May 15th, Nasser deployed large contingents of Egyptian ground forces into the Sinai. Egyptians cheered as their army moved forward to confront the Zionist enemy. Nasser employed defensive-offensive rhetoric. He said Israel would strike first, Egypt would absorb the blow, and then the Arabs would wipe Israel from the face of the Earth. On May 16th, Nasser asked the commander of the UN peace keeping forces in the Sinai to depart in light of the likely war, saying:

I have instructed the armed forces of the United Arab Republic to be prepared for action against Israel the moment the latter carries out an act of aggression against any Arab state. In light of these orders our forces have been concentrated in Sinai on our eastern frontiers. To ensure the

³⁵ Barker, 43.

³⁶ Herzog, 148.

³⁷ Moran, 181 and Herzog, 149.

complete safety of UN forces in observation points along our borders, we request that these forces be removed at once.³⁸

To much of the world's surprise, the UN observers departed immediately. U Thant concluded that the observers had no legal standing without Egyptian approval, and Israel rejected an offer to place the observers in Israel. Egyptian and Israeli forces were now face to face for the first time since 1956. With Egyptian forces continuing to deploy into the Sinai and without the UN observers providing notional protection, Israel began calling up military reserves.

On May 22nd, Egypt went too far. Nasser declared the Strait of Tiran closed to Israeli shipping. Tiran controlled access to Israel's vital Red Sea port of Elat, the closure of which Israel had long identified as cause for war. Egypt's act clearly met one of Israel's previously declared causes for war, and with a tremendous mobilized reserve, Israeli leaders soon felt there was no recourse but war. The only questions were: how would the war begin, who would participate and how would it end. The Israeli military advocated a preemptive strike to eliminate Egypt's air force. Israel hoped the war could be limited to Egypt and Syria, and that Jordan could be convinced to not participate. Battle objectives were to destroy the threatening military forces and seize territory to improve Israel's position.

Israel executed a preemptive strike June 5th when the Israeli air force destroyed almost the entire Egyptian air force on the ground. Eleven Egyptian airfields were caught unprepared "minutes after the end of the Egyptian dawn alert."³⁹ Israeli fighters bombed the runways, strafing and rocketing aircraft on the ground. Only eight Egyptian fighters got airborne, and all were destroyed in air to air combat.⁴⁰ With one preemptive strike, Israel ensured its air superiority over the Egyptian front and gained an enormous advantage over their most deadly foe. By "10:35[am], June 5, 1967, the bulk of the Israeli Air Force was free to destroy the Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi air forces and to engage directly in the destruction of Egyptian armored formations in the Gaza Strip and

³⁸ Barker, 43.

³⁹ Roy K. Flint, Peter W. Kozumplik, Thomas J. Waraksa, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, The Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War* (Wayne, Avery Publishing Group, 1987), 11.

⁴⁰ Hammel, 171

across Sinai.”⁴¹ Despite Israeli entreaties to Jordan’s King Hussein to sit the war out, he could not. He faced tremendous internal pressure to join Egypt, Syria and Iraq in destroying Israel for the everlasting Arab glory. When Israeli jets attacked Egypt, the Jordanian army attacked Israel, primarily with artillery. After Jordan attacked, Israel “swiftly [exploited] the opportunity that had arisen to conquer the old city of Jerusalem and the West Bank.”⁴² Capturing the old city, and the Wailing Wall in particular, was more than enough for many Israelis to declare total victory. For them “the Wailing Wall had symbolized Jewish national hopes for 1,897 years, and the Israelis’ attitude was summed up by [Brigade Commander, Colonel Mordechai] Gur when he stood before its great boulders: ‘None of us alive has ever seen or done anything so great as he has done today.’”⁴³

Despite facing enemies on three sides, Israel did not fight one coherent enemy. In fact Israel fought three separate wars, one each against Egypt, Jordan and Syria, largely in that order. Operating from an interior position, Israel dealt punishing blows to Egyptian and Jordanian ground forces. As Egypt and Syria’s militaries were not well synchronized, Syria stood by while Israel pummeled Egypt, re-conquering the Sinai. Although Jordanian forces fought fiercely, inflicting approximately one half of Israel’s total casualties, Israel’s assault drove the Jordanian army from the West Bank.⁴⁴

Israel’s main thrust reached the east bank of the Suez Canal June 8th. With Egypt’s military knocked out of the war, Israel undertook a rapid redeployment to focus on Syria. Israel focused on capturing the Golan Heights, from which Syria had shelled Israel over the previous twenty years.⁴⁵ In response to Israel’s surprise air attack against Egypt “the farmland below the Golan Heights... suffered from Syrian artillery shelling and raids, but no major Syrian attack [was] launched.”⁴⁶ Israel’s assault against Syria began June 9th, and by the 10th, Israel secured the Golan Heights. Due to differences

⁴¹ Hammel, 171.

⁴² Yacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, The Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East* (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1987), 134.

⁴³ Barker, 86.

⁴⁴ Flint, 14.

⁴⁵ Moran, 184.

⁴⁶ Flint, 14.

between the Arab's political leadership and a lack of military integration and preparation, "Egypt, Syria, and Jordan fought three separate wars and lacked the ability to use reinforcements from the other Arab states effectively."⁴⁷

In less than six days, Israel achieved all of its military objectives and was prepared to accept a cease fire, which the UN was aggressively pushing on the belligerents. The military might of Egypt, Syria and Jordan was smashed, leaving them (at least temporarily) unable to threaten Israel. Israel's geo-strategic position improved greatly: "Israeli-controlled territory more than doubled thanks to its conquest of the West Bank, the Sinai and the Golan Heights, while the total length of its [ground] borders were reduced."⁴⁸ Arab artillery pieces no longer held major Israeli population centers within range and it became much harder for the Jordanian army to cut Israel into two parts.⁴⁹ Capturing the Sinai opened the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and provided tremendous strategic depth against Egypt. At the time, many considered the 1967 War a complete Israeli success.

B. ANALYSIS OF GRAND STRATEGY

The primary target of Israel's grand strategy was the Egyptian and Syrian militaries and the seizure of the Sinai and Golan Heights territories. Prior to the war's start, Israel petitioned Jordan to not enter the war, should it occur.⁵⁰ In pre-war planning Israeli commanders expressed great concern that Jordan might cut Israel into two parts, inhibiting the flow of Israeli military forces between the Sinai and the Golan Heights, considered a key to success. When Jordan refused to sit the war out, and in light of the spectacular success of the June 5th air raids, some Israeli leaders saw Jordan's entrance into the war as a gift allowing Israel to capture the West Bank, a territory many considered part of historical Israel.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Cordesman, 29.

⁴⁸ Moran, 184.

⁴⁹ Moran, 181.

⁵⁰ In fact, Israel continued to request that Jordan sit the war out, even after Jordan began offensive actions June 5th. Moran, 184.

⁵¹ Bar-Simon-Tov, 134.

Israel specifically did not target Egyptian or Jordanian people using any of the instruments of national power. Israel certainly had the capability to use the diplomatic and informational instruments on their people. The economic instrument would not have been as effective, as Israel's economy did not integrate with her Arab neighbors, a necessity for trade sanctions. Especially after the tremendous success of the June 5th air attacks, Israel could have conducted air combat sorties against Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian cities.⁵² Israel chose to dedicate its air force to close air support for the Army and not attack enemy cities. Why? There are three answers. First, Israel lacked the airplanes, training and procedures for effective strategic bombing. Second, strategic bombing could not have brought military success faster than their mechanized army. Third, strategic bombings could prove counterproductive grand-strategically. Israel already faced international censure for her preemptive attack. Killing civilians in cities with airpower could have eroded what little international support and legitimacy Israel enjoyed.

Israel targeted Jordan's government with diplomacy, in an effort to keep her out of the war. Israel also targeted Syria's people and government with the information instrument when Rabin declared that Israel would not tolerate Syria's attacks and could respond in a manner threatening "the very existence of the regime in Damascus."⁵³ Although the Israeli government may not have sanctioned Rabin's statement, it certainly inflamed both Syria and Egypt. Once the war began, Israel ceased vigorous use of the diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of power. Grand strategies to attack an enemy's government usually do so to isolate the government from the military (in an effort to degrade the military's ability to function cohesively), or change the government's mind as part of coercive diplomacy. In the 1967 War, Israel did not need to attack the governments of Egypt, Syria or Jordan to gain an edge against the fielded military forces. Israel was able to destroy her enemy's armies, capture the desired land and present the situation as a *fait accompli* to the Arab states, by focusing on the military alone.

⁵² Flint, 12.

⁵³ Herzog, 148.




Figure 5. A Depiction of the Belligerents' Grand Strategies.

C. INTER-CONNECTIONS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS

Israel's military-government (M-G) connection played a significant role in the war as Israel's military was a successful meritocracy. Officers and enlisted were promoted based on competency, which allowed the military to conduct realistic war planning. Additionally, military leaders reported the results of war planning and intelligence estimates to civilian authorities without fear of reprisal. Realistic planning and frank communications between the military and national command authority resulted in a tremendous advantage in battle.

Egypt and Syria's M-G connections played critical roles in the 1967 War. Unlike Israel, the Egyptian and Syrian militaries were not meritocracies. There was an absence of realistic war planning and their governments had legitimate concerns about their control over the military. President Nasser and Syria's President Nur ad-Din Atasi had

each come to power through a military coup.⁵⁴ As a result, both Nasser and Atasi ensured the military was loyal to them personally in order to ensure their political survival. Personal loyalty ties undermine meritocracy, and they did so in the Egyptian and Syrian militaries, to the detriment of planning, readiness and operational performance. Jordan's M-G connection played a significant role. Without a history of military coups, Jordan developed a superior military which inflicted a disproportionate share of Israel's casualties.

The Israeli government-people (G-P) connection had a significant affect on the war's course. As a democracy, Israeli's elected leaders who displayed competence, and when they failed to do so they were removed from office. As a whole, Israelis felt a direct ownership for the security of their state and with 264,000 people in the active or reserve military, out of a population of 2 million, everyone was either in the military or knew someone who was.

In the Arab states, and particularly Egypt, the G-P connection highlighted the dynamic by which leaders incited their people with promises to destroy Israel, and then got trapped by their own rhetoric. Once the Arab societies yearned for war, it was virtually impossible to avoid it. The non-democratic nature of the Arab states also had a debilitating effect on governmental competence, which affected military performance.

Israel's people-military (P-M) connection played a critical role and was epitomized by the role of reservists. At the time of the 1967 War, Israel's armed force "comprised 2000 regulars and up to 72,000 conscripts and reservists undergoing training."⁵⁵ This core force was designed to be augmented with reservists, so that when fully augmented, Israel could have a 264,000 person military within 72 hours.⁵⁶ As the 1967 crisis escalated, Israel activated greater and greater numbers of reservists, placing tremendous pressure on civil society. The economy ground to a halt as Israel waited for war. Israel's government knew the Arabs maintained a much larger standing military,

⁵⁴ Sydney D. Bailey, *Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process* (London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1990), 248.

⁵⁵ Barker, 49.

⁵⁶ Barker, 48.

able to sustain offensive positions longer than Israel could rely on its activated reserves. Unable to wait, the stalled economy directly contributed to Israel launching its preemptive strike.

Within the Arab states, the P-M connection played only a minor role. Certainly the military keenly felt peoples' yearning for the destruction of Israel. This could have pressured military leaders to inflate readiness reports prior to battle.




Figure 6. A Summary of the Inter-Element Connections.

D. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT'S LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND PASSION

As war approached, passions reached such heights in Israel, Syria and Egypt that people on both sides clamored to start the war. Egypt had a long-running "hate Israel" campaign that began immediately after the 1956 war; "pamphlets, films, television, radio and even school books were used to foment the 'ideological' campaign against Israel."⁵⁷ On top of the long standing "hate Israel" campaign, President Nasser stepped up the anti-Israel rhetoric at his May 14, 1967 Palestine Day rally of Arab students. At the rally President Nasser's theme was:

⁵⁷ Barker, 41.

that the 'Arab evolution' was faced with a coordinated conspiracy in which the US and British 'imperialism' was acting together with both Israel and 'Arab reaction.' ('Arab reaction' referred to King Hussein of Jordan, who was at loggerheads with Syria over the activities of the Fatah terrorists, and who refused to allow Egyptian troops to be stationed in his country.)⁵⁸

The Arab street reacted with tremendous approval. Although Nasser's popularity had been at a deep low following five years of prolonged fighting in Yemen, he was again "at the peak of popularity, as one Arab government after the other volunteered support and was caught up in the enthusiasm of the impending war."⁵⁹ Throughout the Arab world, people spoke openly about the impending destruction of the state of Israel. The Arab world thought it was ready for the final showdown with Israel. Nasser's state controlled radio station *Saut-al Arab* (Voice of the Arabs) proclaimed "all Egypt is now prepared to plunge into total war which will put an end to Israel."⁶⁰ Nasser himself said "our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight."⁶¹

Within Israeli society, most did not yearn for battle, but were resigned and committed to it. They believed that if war was inevitable, it should begin and be best conducted to Israel's advantage. Some within Israel, however, wanted to fight: "a father told of his 10 year old son returning from school saying that if the Israeli Government would not fight he did not wish to be an Israeli any more- he would go to America and be an American."⁶² Of course the opinions of one 10 year old boy cannot be said to alter the actions of a government, yet the anecdote reveals how far combative feelings had spread within Israel.

Looking at the 1967 War through the lens of importance proves interesting. Simply put, the war was of critical importance to Israel (which feared being wiped out of existence), and not critically important to Egypt, Syria or Jordan, regardless of their rhetoric. Considering the seven levels of importance, the 1967 War was a war of choice for the Arabs, with significant importance. Outside of Nasser's fiery rhetoric (and

⁵⁸ Barker, 43.

⁵⁹ Herzog, 149.

⁶⁰ Barker, 44.

⁶¹ Barker, 44.

⁶² Barker, 44.

subsequently inflamed populous) nothing pushed the Arabs to war. Egypt could have responded to the (false) reports of Israel's upcoming invasion of Syria without provoking war. The Arabs fought for pride, because of their embarrassment in the 1948 and 1956 Wars, and to win a homeland for another people, the Palestinians. The Israeli perspective was completely different. Fears of Israel's destruction led to "one Israeli doctor [being] approached by a middle age woman who wanted suicide pills to take if necessary - she had lived through one of Hitler's concentration camps and felt that she could not live through anything similar."⁶³ Israelis feared eradication and their commitment to the upcoming war was infused throughout Israeli society.

In six days, Israel's masterful strategic and operational execution removed the Arab states' ability to fight a modern war. This was the turning point, where Israel's actions clarified the war's importance for the Arabs. Prior to the war Arab leaders called for "total war" and expressed a willingness to bear any burden to destroy Israel. Faced with the destruction of their modern military forces, they could have sent further masses of infantry into battle to fight a non-modern bloody campaign. Instead Arab leaders decided they had been defeated, and accepted the loss of non-critical territory. The Arab response to Israeli success is akin to being punched in the nose. At times, as blood pours down the nose, one reevaluates a conflict and determines it's not worth fighting for after all. Getting a little bloody can have a very clarifying effect on priorities.⁶⁴

E. COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

In reviewing the 1967 War and this chapter's analytical framework, it is impossible to see Israel's grand strategy as anything other than focusing on the Arab states' military element, using the military force instrument. As discussed in the Analysis of Grand Strategy, Israel never bombed Arab population centers, did not raise sanctions or conduct an economic blockade. An information campaign to change the minds of the Arab people or government was never attempted, no doubt because it was considered

⁶³Barker, 44.

⁶⁴ The U.S. response to the October 3rd, 1999 "Black Hawk Down" incident in Somalia, or the October 23rd, 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Corp's barracks in Beirut are similar examples of the "bloody nose" effect. The U.S. had said the missions were very important but then got bloody. After the sight of fresh blood, the missions were determined to be not that important, and the U.S. exited the situation as quickly as diplomatically possible.

pointless. That said, what are the limitations? The Instrument-Element Model and details presented do not explain how constrained Nasser felt by the Arab people's hysteria. While it is certainly reasonable to suppose that Nasser built up a wave of emotions that subsequently swept him and Egypt away, references from contemporary Egyptian sources would add weight to that supposition. Additionally, the role of the international system remains indistinct. The United States was not yet Israel's chief patron in 1967, and its leadership was taken by surprise when the war broke out, having assumed that Israel's evident military superiority would suffice to deter surrounding Arab states. The Soviet Union's role is especially murky, and its motives for passing what it knew to be false intelligence about Israeli plans against Syria are a mystery to this day.

F. FINAL THOUGHTS

One amazing aspect of the 1967 War was that despite Israel's operational military brilliance, the war proved inconclusive grand-strategically.⁶⁵ Israel's success, while spectacular did not destroy Egypt, Syria, or Jordan. Seized lands were not vital to the continuity of the Arab states and

none of the Arab states who lost territory in the Six Day War was prepared to make peace in exchange for its return. Egypt felt humiliated by this new demonstration of Israeli military superiority, and waged a campaign of bombardment and raids across the Suez Canal that became known as the War of Attrition.⁶⁶

And so the Arab states accepted the UN ceasefire and prepared for another round of battle. One should remember Nasser's pre-war rhetoric when considering that Egypt, Syria and Jordan accepted their losses. The Arabs had a base of eighty million people to raise a *levée en mass* and continue the fight against Israel, but did not.⁶⁷ Egypt said it was ready to fight a 'total war' to destroy the state of Israel and bear any burden to do so, as long as the burden was very light and the challenges not significant.

⁶⁵ Moran, 185.

⁶⁶ Moran, 185.

⁶⁷ Of course, not all eighty million Arabs were of age suitable for military service. Nevertheless the Arabs had tremendous untapped reserves.

Historians disagree about Nasser's motives in the run up to the 1967 War. One well researched interpretation is Chaim Herzog's which propounds that Nasser wanted war in 1967. Herzog laid out three assumptions of how Nasser thought the war would unfold. Herzog derived these assumptions from a close analysis of "the articles of Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, Editor of *Al Ahram*, who was Nasser's closest confidant at that time."⁶⁸ Herzog presents Nasser's three assumptions as:

1. That, after the United Nations forces would be withdrawn at his request, he would close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.
2. That, following this action, the Israelis would be likely to try to open the Straits by force and break the blockade. This would lead to war.
3. That, in the event of an outbreak of war, the ratio of forces and the state of preparedness of his forces guaranteed Egyptian military success. Nasser was convinced that, in a combination of both the military and political struggle that would ensue, he would gain the upper hand.⁶⁹

Whether the Arabs were incompetently conducting an "extraordinarily naïve exercise in coercive diplomacy," or expecting to actually fight, they never undertook the planning and training needed to make the destruction of Israel a reality.⁷⁰ The Egyptian Army's 1967 War Operation plan "*Kahir*" was not designed to invade Israel, but instead to conduct a mobile defense of the Sinai.⁷¹ As the 1967 War grew close, Nasser ordered the Army to conduct Operation *Kahir*, sending the Egyptian army into the Sinai, but

prior to May 1967, no concrete steps were ever taken to implement Operation *Kahir* beyond committing the details to paper. The plan was never actually promulgated to division commanders, and no war games were ever conducted. Indeed, no map-table exercise was ever held.⁷²

As a mobile defense of the Sinai, *Kahir* was never enough to destroy Israel. The Arab states lacked a plan for how to invade Israel and how to manage the two million Jewish

⁶⁸ Herzog, 151.

⁶⁹ Herzog, 151.

⁷⁰ Moran, 184. Hammel, 146.

⁷¹ Hammel, 145-146.

⁷² Hammel, 146.

refugees that success would have created; yet military commanders assured their leaders that they were ready to fight and win.

Egypt and the Arabs presented Israel with a challenge when Egypt closed the Strait of Tiran, and massed so powerful a force on Israel's borders as to threaten its existence.⁷³ Israel responded by destroying the Arab's deployed military, seizing the Sinai, West Bank and Golan Heights. With their passions cooled, the Arabs were unwilling to fight a total war for the destruction of Israel. Instead they accepted the UN ceasefire. The Arabs may have been conducting a policy of coercive diplomacy. They may have actually intended war. Either way, Israel's response, driven by a combination of intense public passion and cold-blooded military calculation, appears in retrospect to have been over-determined; as was the stunning military victory that resulted.

⁷³ When the war began, there were 250,000 Arab soldiers, over 2000 tanks and 700 front line fighter and bomber aircraft surrounding Israel. Herzog, 149.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. FOCUSING ON THE GOVERNMENT: THE 1999 KOSOVO WAR

NATO's grand strategy in the 1999 Kosovo War focused almost entirely on changing the behavior of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (F.R.Y.'s) government.⁷⁴ The F.R.Y. was engaged in a bitter internal war that pitted the Serbians (ethnic Slavs) against the Kosovo Albanians (ethnic Albanians) who lived primarily in Kosovo, a province of Serbia. A Serbian nationalist, Slobodan Milosevic, had been elected President of the F.R.Y. by championing Serbian strength over the Kosovo Albanians, and his government actively repressed the Kosovo Albanians. Some Kosovo Albanians responded by forming the Kosovo Liberation Army (K.L.A.) which fought a terrorist insurgency to seize control of Kosovo from Serbia. F.R.Y./Serb forces, whose ranks had been purged of ethnic Albanians by Milosevic's government, responded savagely with atrocities intended to break the K.L.A.'s popular support and convince Kosovo Albanians to leave Serbia. Many Kosovo Albanians did leave, which created an international refugee problem.

Western leaders were appalled that ethnic cleansing was occurring in Europe and vowed to do something. Russia and China threatened to veto any UN resolution that interfered in Yugoslavia's internal matters and the crisis escalated. NATO, led by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. President Bill Clinton decided to get involved and stop the F.R.Y.'s violent campaign. F.R.Y. forces and Milosevic ignored NATO's warnings and continued to repress the Kosovo Albanians.

That NATO represented nineteen separate countries played a central role in the formulation of grand strategy and the conduct of the war. Maintaining alliance cohesion and degrading the enemy's alliance or sources of international support were critical parts of both belligerents' grand strategies. NATO's war had two phases. In the first phase, NATO sought, unsuccessfully, to coerce the F.R.Y. with military air strikes that were noteffectively coordinated with a coherent grand strategy. In the second phase, NATO

⁷⁴ This chapter refers to the 1999 military action between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the Kosovo War. For political reasons NATO leaders referred to it as coercive diplomacy, the Kosovo campaign or OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. See: General Wesley K. Clark, U.S. Army (Retired), *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, (New York, PublicAffairs Books, 2001), 481.

developed an integrated grand strategy and seamlessly integrated all instruments of national power to isolate, deny, punish and ultimately compel the F.R.Y. to surrender.

This chapter begins with the contours of action. With a brief outline of the conflict established, four aspects of the war will be considered. They are: an analysis of NATO's grand strategy, the inter-connection between the three elements of each belligerent's organic system, the degree to which the passions were inflamed and how important each belligerent considered the conflict. The limitations of this analytic approach will also be discussed.

A. CONTOURS OF ACTION

The direct roots of NATO's Kosovo campaign lay in the unraveling of communist Yugoslavia, following the death of its founder, Josip Broz Tito, in 1980, and its gradual replacement by an unstable multi-ethnic federation dominated by its largest component state, Serbia. Historically, Serbia's ethnic tensions and violence had roots several hundred years old. Aggravating these tensions, Kosovo Polje, a battle site of tremendous emotional value to the Serbs, lay within Kosovo. At that site in 1389, Serbia's Prince Lazar died while resisting the Ottoman Turks expansion.⁷⁵ Serbs considered the site the "heartland of their nation."⁷⁶

In 1989 a wave of Serb resentment against Kosovo Albanians propelled Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian nationalist, to the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Milosevic downgraded Kosovo's autonomy, purged ethnic Albanians from leadership positions and suppressed Albanian culture.⁷⁷ Kosovo Albanian resistance inspired fierce official reprisals, a cycle of violence that alarmed Western leaders, who twice warned the two belligerents to cease hostilities (June and September, 1998).⁷⁸ Within the UN, Russia and China said they would veto resolutions that interfered with Yugoslavia's internal matters. Without UN support, Western leaders turned to NATO to unify their voices and hopefully project

⁷⁵ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York, New York University Press, 1998), 69.

⁷⁶ Malcolm, 58.

⁷⁷ Malcolm, 344.

⁷⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo*, (Westport, Praeger Publishers, 2001), 10-11.

legitimacy. In early 1999, NATO's threats brought F.R.Y. and K.L.A. leaders to Rambouillet, France where NATO outlined their solution to the crisis. Despite NATO's significant pressure, the talks broke down.

War followed on March 24th, 1999, almost literally as an extension and amplification of the stalled negotiations. Two long range bombers dropped precision bombs; aircraft and ships fired cruise missiles, the first of which exploded at 8:01 pm Kosovo time.⁷⁹ The attack concentrated on F.R.Y. air defenses to aid subsequent strikes.⁸⁰ NATO wanted to send Milosevic the signal that it was serious about stopping the suppression of Kosovo Albanians. Planners and leaders believed that briefly bombing Yugoslavia would force Milosevic to the bargaining table and so a "limited 2-day strike" was the basis for planning NATO's air campaign.⁸¹ Only "112 US and 102 allied aircraft [were] committed to the campaign, [and] only a relatively small number were shooters capable of delivering precision weapons effectively."⁸² NATO leaders had publicly disqualified discussion of a ground invasion. The day the war began President Clinton said bluntly "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war."⁸³ From the start, NATO's air campaign consisted of three phases of increasing destructiveness, but leaders believed that only a few days of phase I bombing would be necessary to force the F.R.Y. back to the negotiating table.⁸⁴ The three phases were:

Phase I: establish air superiority over Serbia and supremacy over Kosovo...

Phase II: attack military targets inside Kosovo, as well as Serbian reinforcements in Yugoslavia south of the 44th parallel.

⁷⁹ Cordesman, 20-21.

⁸⁰ Clark, 193.

⁸¹ Department of Defense, *Report to Congress: Kosovo / Allied Force After-Action Report*, (Washington, D.C., January 31, 2000), 23.

⁸² Cordesman, 20.

⁸³ Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 130.

⁸⁴ John E. Peters et al., *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 16.

Phase III: expand air operations to cover a wide range of military targets throughout the whole territory of Yugoslavia.”⁸⁵

Yugoslavia did not capitulate as expected, however, and between March 26th and the 30th, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s decision-making body, decided “to escalate the air campaign to phase II [begun March 27th] and then II plus [March 30th].”⁸⁶ With NATO’s new policy direction, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana directed “SACEUR [General Wesley Clark] to initiate a broader range of air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, intensifying action against Yugoslav forces.”⁸⁷ As a result, NATO bombed the Yugoslavian interior ministry April 3rd, the first attack within central Belgrade.⁸⁸

The psychological effect of NATO’s escalatory, coercive strategy was not initially as expected. The bombing campaign “lifted a constraint on [Milosevic] that may have been operative until that point. Before the bombs began to fall, he had an incentive to keep NATO from attacking him. Once the attack was underway, however, he no longer had that same reason to hold back.”⁸⁹ And so Serbian forces executed “Operation Horseshoe,” their previously established plan to purge Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo through terror and direct attack, including “emptying the key cities of Prizren, Pec and Pristina of their largely [Kosovo] Albanian populations.”⁹⁰ Despite NATO’s best efforts, F.R.Y. forces were succeeding in their ethnic cleansing strategy. Responding to the humanitarian crisis, NATO increased its emphasis on attacking fielded F.R.Y. forces, including tanks, artillery pieces and troop formations. Unfortunately, NATO’s airpower was not well suited to stop Serbian atrocities.⁹¹

⁸⁵ Peters, 16.

⁸⁶ Department of State, *Kosovo Chronology: Timeline of events 1989-1999 relating to the crisis in Kosovo*, (Washington, D.C., May 21, 1999), 23. Accessed: September 1, 2005. Available online at: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_kosovo_timeline.html. See also: Daalder, 117-118.

⁸⁷ Department of State, 6. *NATO Handbook* (Belgium, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 496.

⁸⁸ United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, *Kosovo, Lessons from the Crisis: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defense by Command of Her Majesty*, (London, The Stationary Office, June 2000), 60. See also: Department of State, 6.

⁸⁹ Daalder, 107.

⁹⁰ Daalder, 58-59.

⁹¹ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York, Metropolitan Books, 2000), 62.

From April 23rd through the 25th, the NATO states held a summit of their Heads of State and Government. Leaders discussed the Kosovo War's progress and grand strategy. The war had dramatically escalated beyond the modest two day strike envisioned before the war began. By April 23rd,

NATO had 690 aircraft in the vicinity of operations around Yugoslavia, as well as twenty ships in the vicinity, roughly twice as many of each as at the War's beginning.⁹²

As a result of discussions, the North Atlantic Council directed warships to cut off the F.R.Y.'s flow of oil.⁹³

NATO leaders led by Prime Minister Tony Blair began limited discussions about invading Kosovo to expel F.R.Y. forces. Prime Minister Blair signaled this shift during a televised interview with PBS's Jim Lehrer when he said: "we should plan and assess all options" which, in context, meant ground troops in Kosovo.⁹⁴

On the last day of the Washington Summit, Russian President Yeltsin called President Clinton. Yeltsin had determined Russia's interest required that he work with NATO to solve the Kosovo crisis, rather than not lose credibility and the good will of the West by supporting Russia's traditional client, Serbia. That April 25th phone call "marked a definite turning point in US-Russian relations" and indeed the whole Kosovo War.⁹⁵ Before Russia's shift, Milosevic could at least hope for direct Russian material support and diplomatic aid in the UN. Afterwards he knew the F.R.Y. stood alone.⁹⁶

Recognizing Russia's new role, "NATO [invited former Russian Prime Minister] Chernomyrdin to talks on Kosovo" designed to get the F.R.Y. to capitulate.⁹⁷ The same day during a televised interview there was a dramatic display of Yugoslav dissention when "F.R.Y. Deputy PM Vuk Draskovic... [called] on Serb leaders to tell the public 'the

⁹² Daalder, 119.

⁹³ Department of State, 7.

⁹⁴ Public Broadcasting Service, *Online News Hour: Targeting Serb TV* (April 23, 1999). Accessed: September 1, 2005. Available online at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-jun99/serb_tv_4-23.html, 1

⁹⁵ Daalder, 139.

⁹⁶ Clark, 406.

⁹⁷ Department of State, 8.

truth' about NATO's resolve, world opinion toward the Serbs, and that Russia [would] not provide military aid to the F.R.Y. Draskovic [advised] the Serb population to support the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force in Kosovo.”⁹⁸ Milosevic subsequently fired Draskovic, but not before the Serbian people had heard a credible dissenting view of the war.

In the meantime, collateral damage from the bombing campaign was beginning to have serious political consequences. On April 23rd, NATO bombed Belgrade's state-run television station, Radio Television of Serbia (RTS), with precision weapons, knocking it off the air for 6 hours and killing 10 civilians.⁹⁹ Many were outraged at this controversial attack, including “the European Broadcasting Union, made up of 68 broadcasters in 49 countries” which noted that the Belgrade RTS “center had been used to transmit reports by international as well as local media.”¹⁰⁰ NATO officials defended the attack by claiming that the facility transmitted Serbian propaganda, which was true enough, though largely unrelated to the immediately pressing problem of what to do to stop the expulsion of the Kosovo Albanians.

Far worse was the attack on the Chinese Embassy. On May 7th it was destroyed by five 2000 pound precision bombs dropped from a B-2 bomber. Twenty people were wounded, and three died.¹⁰¹ A U.S. review of the incident determined that although the five bombs struck their designated targets, the CIA produced those aim points with a flawed planning process.¹⁰² Certainly the attack “[poisoned] U.S. and Chinese relations... and helped to push the Chinese towards siding with Serbia in the UN.”¹⁰³

Eight weeks into NATO's war “both [General] Clark and NATO's political leaders were desperate for results. A string of dreadful accidents- hitting the train on the

⁹⁸ This important interview occurred on Studio B TV, a Serbian television program. Department of State, 8.

⁹⁹ Public Broadcasting Service, 1.

¹⁰⁰ Public Broadcasting Service, 1.

¹⁰¹ Department of State, 9.

¹⁰² Cordesman, 108-115.

¹⁰³ Cordesman, 104.

bridge, bombing the refugee convoy and a string a Serbian old people's home- were all draining away public support for the air war. Opinion polls were shifting alarmingly.”¹⁰⁴

President Clinton recognized his declaration eliminating the use of ground troops, while probably politically helpful on March 24th, could be fueling the F.R.Y.'s resistance. As ground forces could be needed and to undermine Milosevic's resolve, on May 18th, “President Clinton very publicly announced... that ‘all options [meaning ground forces] are on the table,’ openly [ending] the flat rejection of the ground option he had made on March 24.”¹⁰⁵ Additionally NATO leaders authorized attacking phase III civil infrastructure targets which had previously been off limits.¹⁰⁶ Such targets included bridges that NATO termed “dual use,” meaning that they could be used by civilians or military forces.

On May 23rd, NATO bombed the electrical grids of major Serbian cities, saying they fed air defense and command and control sites, although it also “meant taking out the power to hospitals, babies’ incubators, [and] water-pumping stations.”¹⁰⁷ The attack “sent a powerful message to [Serbia’s] civilian population, who until then had been largely unaffected by NATO’s air war.”¹⁰⁸

On May 27th Milosevic “was told about NATO’s likely invasion plans by Victor Chernomyrdin during the latter’s first visit to Belgrade.”¹⁰⁹ With Russia’s shift, and in light of the potential invasion, Milosevic began to signal a willingness to comply with NATO’s demands. On June 3rd, “The FRY [accepted] terms brought to Belgrade by EU envoy Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Chernomyrdin” which smoothed the way for F.R.Y./NATO direct talks.¹¹⁰ NATO and F.R.Y. officers met to settle the terms of hostilities and in the evening of June 9th, they signed a Military Technical Agreement

¹⁰⁴ Ignatieff, 107.

¹⁰⁵ Cordesman, 244-45.

¹⁰⁶ Daalder, 145.

¹⁰⁷ Ignatieff, 108.

¹⁰⁸ Ignatieff, 108.

¹⁰⁹ Daalder, 160 and 205.

¹¹⁰ Department of State, 10.

which declared that Yugoslavia would comply with NATO demands and NATO would end its air attacks.¹¹¹ NATO's war lasted 78 days.

B. ANALYSIS OF GRAND STRATEGY

NATO's grand strategy primarily targeted the F.R.Y. government. Because NATO saw the F.R.Y. as a dictatorial state, Milosevic was the focus of effort. As described in the Department of Defense after action report to Congress, NATO had three main interests in the Kosovo crisis:

First, Serb aggression in Kosovo directly threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of southeastern Europe...

Second, Belgrade's repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions...

Third, Milosevic's conduct leading up to Operation Allied Force directly challenged the credibility of NATO, an alliance that has formed the bedrock of transatlantic security for 50 years.¹¹²

With these three interests, NATO attempted to persuade Milosevic diplomatically to stop repressing the Kosovo Albanians. Simultaneously, NATO told the K.L.A. to cease their offensive and let a peace process develop. Initially NATO leaders worked within the UN framework but found Russia and China limited their efforts. Russia and China were concerned with setting an international precedent whereby the UN could interfere in a state's sovereign matters with force, peace keepers or an occupying contingent. Russia additionally had historic links to Serbia. Seeing Russia and China threaten to veto proposals in the UN undoubtedly gave Milosevic confidence that he could successfully resist NATO's aggression.

With the UN option blocked and the failed Rambouillet talks, NATO began its air war on Serbia. The stated goals for the air war were:

- A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;

¹¹¹ NATO Handbook, 127.

¹¹² Department of Defense, 3-4.

- The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;
- The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
- The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations;
- The establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.¹¹³

NATO first focused on punishing the F.R.Y.'s government with airpower. NATO's initial air strikes failed to coerce Milosevic. His connection with Russia was still strong, damage minimal, and NATO had clearly ruled out an invasion. The F.R.Y. used NATO's bombing to advantage and accelerated its ethnic cleansing campaign as General Clark admitted:

At the end of April... after six weeks of bombing, there were more Serb forces inside Kosovo than when the bombing began. The air campaign alone could neither halt ethnic cleansing nor avoid mounting civilian casualties.¹¹⁴

Sensing failure, NATO leaders overhauled their grand strategy, culminating at the Washington Summit. NATO's second grand strategy placed greater emphasis on weakening Russia's support to Serbia. NATO split Russia from Serbia by highlighting Serbia's depraved acts, and reminding Russia of how its long term interests lay with the Western powers. NATO worked to weaken Serbia's internal cohesion and information dissemination, which led to bombing Belgrade's RTS TV station. NATO damaged Serbia economically by cutting off their access to oil.

Internally NATO focused on maintaining alliance cohesion. NATO maintained cohesion through numerous meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the Washington Summit and by giving each government the right to refuse objectionable orders. The most important moment in alliance cohesion didn't concern NATO members but Russia. Russia had lost in its effort to keep NATO's war from occurring and so Yeltsin became:

¹¹³ NATO Handbook, 126.

¹¹⁴ Ignatieff, 62.

intent on finding a way to end the war rapidly and on making sure that Russia would play a key role in bringing that about... [His government] appeared to have realized that its interests lay not in opposing the war outright but in helping Milosevic get as good as deal as he possibly could.¹¹⁵

With Russia publicly supporting NATO's war termination conditions, "the diplomatic encirclement of Milosevic was complete... At the last moment, military force and diplomatic leverage came together."¹¹⁶ Serbia faced an integrated grand strategy, and a united opposition.

Finally, NATO abandoned its no invasion policy, which had hindered NATO's success by letting Milosevic think Serbia could weather the storm. Serbia received the message about a possible invasion from NATO leaders who dropped hints during press interviews, from Milosevic's May 27th meeting with Chernomyrdin and the April arrival of Task Force Hawk, a U.S. aviation regiment, in Albania. This regiment would have formed the nucleus of the invasion force.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Daalder, 140.

¹¹⁶ Ignatieff, 110.

¹¹⁷ Clark, 425.




Figure 7. A Depiction of the Belligerents' Grand Strategies.

C. INTER-CONNECTIONS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS

NATO's military-government (M-G) connection was remarkable for its command complexity.¹¹⁸ As an alliance, NATO troops collectively answered to twenty separate masters, the 19 member states and NATO itself. Each unit had a NATO operational chain of command, and also a direct link back to its own national military headquarters. At times units refused NATO orders when they contradicted their national policies, a form of tactical flexibility that undoubtedly contributed to strategic cohesion.¹¹⁹ Senior command lines were reasonably clear. There was one military officer in charge, General Clark, and he had direct control over all operating forces in the theater.

The F.R.Y.'s M-G connection was ill defined. Reports alternate between describing Milosevic's dictatorial control over the F.R.Y., or emphasizing lawless

¹¹⁸ To simplify analysis of the three elements' inter-connections, NATO is depicted as a homogenous organic system.

¹¹⁹ Daalder, 176. Ignatieff, 207.

unauthorized atrocities. The F.R.Y.'s regular forces appeared well organized with professional links to their government. Serbian air defense forces maintained defensive fire throughout the war, and ground forces departed Kosovo in an orderly manner after the Military Technical Agreement was signed.

NATO's government-people (G-P) connection played a critical role, as NATO's leaders needed to convince their populous of the war's legitimacy, maintain support despite killing innocent civilians, and limit casualties. Before the war's start many debated whether NATO could legally start a war without a UN Security Council resolution. NATO leaders had to develop alternate justifications and tried to sell them to their citizens. During the war NATO leaders carefully cultivated internal support. Weapons went astray, targeteers made mistakes, and cluster bomb sub-munitions occasionally failed to detonate properly, littering the landscape with inconspicuous, frequently lethal unexploded ordnance. These circumstances made maintaining support for the war difficult, especially given the myth of perfect precision weapons.

The F.R.Y.'s G-P connection played a vital role through the conflict as Serbians absolutely wanted to maintain control of Kosovo Polje, the spiritual heartland of their nation. This emotional factor pressured Serbia against bargaining away Kosovo under NATO's threat. Milosevic may have been an autocratic ruler, but he enjoyed an authentic popular mandate. Serbians wanted to keep control of Kosovo and if Milosevic did not fight to keep Kosovo he could find himself deposed. Bellicose rhetoric brought Milosevic to power and constrained him while there.

NATO's people-military (P-M) connection was defined by the way NATO carried out its bombings. Fear of F.R.Y. air defenses led NATO to bomb at altitudes greater than 15,000 feet, which often lessened effectiveness, and may have increase collateral casualties among civilians on the ground. At the same time, this altitude restriction contributed greatly to NATO remarkable record of zero combat losses over the course of the entire war. NATO states activated only a small number of reservists, never raised a draft, and were very concerned about limiting casualties. American leaders still discussed the October 1993 Somalia debacle where the deaths of 18 soldiers led to policy failure.

As the F.R.Y.'s "armed forces were formed primarily by conscripts," there was a strong P-M connection, however its effect on the war was minor.¹²⁰ For many Serbs, the war appeared "virtual" until the May 23rd bombing of the electrical grids. General Clark described the F.R.Y.'s experience prior to NATO bombing the electrical grids and major bridges as the "only air campaign in history in which lovers strolled down river banks in the gathering twilight and ate out at outdoor cafes and watched the fireworks."¹²¹ As the war progressed Milosevic "had trouble raising extra troops... [and] Reports surfaced of Serb men protesting their calls to military duty in Kosovo and of a number of actual desertions by forces in the field."¹²² While notable that the P-M connection was breaking down, such incidents played no significant role in the F.R.Y.'s execution of its grand strategy.




Figure 8. A Summary of the Inter-Element Connections.

¹²⁰ Daalder, 155.

¹²¹ General Wesley Clark as quoted in Ignatieff, 108.

¹²² Daalder, 155.

D. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT'S LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND PASSION

Both belligerents in the 1999 Kosovo War considered the war important, at different levels and for different reasons. At first NATO leaders considered the war significantly important for three reasons. First, they found ethnic cleansing in Europe abhorrent, and second they feared destabilization within the region. Third, once NATO threatened Milosevic and he did not back down, they feared compromising the alliance's future credibility. NATO's citizenry considered the Kosovo crises only moderately important, leading to leaders like President Clinton publicly ruling out ground forces to avoid antagonizing the citizenry. As the war continued, NATO found its credibility eroding. The fear of what losing would do to NATO led

Henry Kissinger, long an opponent of Albrights' moralizing interventionism, [to] publicly [declare], once the bombing began, that NATO could not be allowed to fail. If it did, the entire strategic architecture, linking American and European interests since World War II, would be in ruins.¹²³

After the Washington Summit, NATO considered the war of major importance because its credibility was in jeopardy. Leaders prepared for the previously dismissed ground invasion. What was supposed to be NATO's short "Cabinet War" escalated, so that by war's end its importance was higher than when it began.¹²⁴

The F.R.Y. considered the war vitally important. Serbian ethnic nationalism, and the supposed humiliations that Serbs had suffered at the hands of Albanians, Bosnians, and other Yugoslav minorities, had been the centerpiece of the campaign that won Milosevic his office as president. The importance of Kosovo Polje had been a dominant theme in Milosevic's nationalism and he could not easily abandon it under NATO's threats. Losing control of Kosovo could also mean that tens of thousands of Serbians would be expelled from their homes by revenge minded Kosovo Albanians. Only after the Washington summit when NATO leaders displayed strong alliance solidarity, the bombing escalated, an invasion was possible, and Russia shifted support to NATO, did the F.R.Y. reevaluate its grand strategy. Milosevic and F.R.Y. leaders likely came to the

¹²³ Ignatieff, 64.

¹²⁴ Ignatieff, 111.

conclusion that the war would continue into the foreseeable future with commensurate damage, that the terms of surrender would not improve and there would not be a shift in the international system that would favorably end the war. If NATO invaded, F.R.Y. leaders would lose everything and Serbia would be occupied. F.R.Y. leaders balanced the vital, if largely symbolic, importance of maintaining Kosovo against the critical importance of maintaining Serbia (if without Kosovo) and chose the latter. As important as Kosovo was, F.R.Y. leaders were determined to maintain control of Serbia proper.

NATO's passions were not inflamed. The populous recoiled against nightly TV images of F.R.Y. atrocities but did not clamor for war. No one rushed off to join the military and fight the F.R.Y. Leaders decided to fight the F.R.Y. and then cajoled their citizens to support the bombing. In America, President Clinton actively demobilized the citizenry when he dismissed ground forces and sought a grand strategy with the absolute least possible U.S. casualties.

Serbia's passions were inflamed to fight the Kosovo Albanians, not NATO. Milosevic rose to fame on a tide of ethnic nationalism, promising Serbians a greater place in society. Years of ethnic violence between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs led many Serbs to support punishing and expelling the K.L.A. and other Kosovo Albanians from Serbia (including Kosovo). NATO's bombing shifted Serbia's attention from suppressing the Kosovo Albanians to being bombed and passions cooled.

E. COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

The analysis presented above is limited by a lack of writing on Serbia's own views of NATO's war. Basic questions like "why did Milosevic surrender" are subject to scholarly debate. Some argue that NATO's bombing played the dominant role, others that it was the potential for an invasion. Some stress Russia's shift away from its traditional client. A conclusive answer must await the recovery of the necessary documentary evidence.

Particularly for the war's second half, a counter argument could be developed that NATO in fact focused on destroying F.R.Y. fielded forces, rather than on coercing the

government or undermining public support for the war. As NATO realized that Milosevic would not be quickly deterred, and that the pace of atrocities was accelerating,

the number of [FRY military and special police] target groups that NATO struck increased by 177 percent from Day 20 to Day 29 and from 31 to 86 army and police targets.¹²⁵

It nevertheless seems clear that, to the extent that the acceleration of ethnic cleansing caused NATO to shift its focus toward the fielded military, it was largely ineffective. The F.R.Y. continued to operate smoothly enough in Kosovo and “NATO reported that the rate of atrocities seemed to have sharply increased during April 20-April 22, and that the number of mass graves had increased by 4 to 10 times.”¹²⁶ Throughout the war, NATO warplanes tried to destroy F.R.Y. fielded combat forces and their logistics structure, and claimed significant success. Claims of success were undercut when

NATO announced on June 22 that it estimated the Yugoslav army and special police forces had departed Kosovo with about 47,000 Serb troops and nearly 800 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. This withdrawal proceeded smoothly over 11 days – creating growing uncertainties about NATO’s claims in terms of damage to POL facilities, lines of communication, and infrastructure. It also created serious questions about the credibility of NATO reporting on damage to the Serbian ground forces in Kosovo. Not only did the withdrawal confirm the Serbian build-up that had taken place during the war, it indicated that NATO might well have over estimated the numbers of Serbian weapons it had destroyed.¹²⁷

If NATO’s focus was on the fielded military, it was only marginally successful and would not explain the overall policy success. Only a focus on the F.R.Y.’s government reflects the contours of action.

F. FINAL THOUGHTS

NATO’s success is a dramatic example of what can happen with an integrated grand strategy, a coherent alliance, and an isolated enemy, though it must be emphasized that none of these factors were present when the war began. Initially, NATO

¹²⁵ Cordesman, 210.

¹²⁶ Cordesman, 211.

¹²⁷ Cordesman, 220.

concentrated its effort on bombing Serbian leadership with some attacks on fielded forces. NATO leaders expected the war to be brief as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright emphasized the day the bombings began: “I don’t see this as a long-term operation. I think this is something... that is achievable within a relatively short period of time.”¹²⁸ Diplomatic efforts focused on maintaining NATO’s cohesion. No integrated plan linked the instruments of national power.

Fortunately NATO leaders realized their grand strategy, such as it was, was not working. Atrocities accelerated. The F.R.Y. moved additional forces into Kosovo even as the bombing intensified: “airpower was in fact powerless to physically prevent Milosevic’s atrocities against the ethnic Albanians.”¹²⁹ Neighboring countries struggled to deal with the refugees fleeing Kosovo and NATO’s credibility was jeopardized. “Perversely,” as Ivo Daalder has noted “Milosevic came to NATO’s rescue. In a way that alliance leaders did not anticipate, he shored up their resolve and cohesion by his brutal treatment of the ethnic Albanians.”¹³⁰

In the lead up to the Washington Summit, NATO leaders began to craft a more integrated response, and were actively working to halt Russia’s support to Milosevic. At the summit leaders displayed

a united front against Milosevic, something that probably contributed to his surrender as much as any NATO bomb or the incipient threat of an invasion.¹³¹

NATO leaders recognized the need to maintain unity, both to eliminate Milosevic’s hope of fracturing the alliance, and to isolate sympathy and support for the F.R.Y. The campaign to internationally isolate the F.R.Y. highlighted Serbian barbarity. Bringing it all together:

after the NATO summit, the Clinton administration put in place an integrated strategic campaign plan that combined military, economic, diplomatic, and other means to achieve core US objectives.¹³²

¹²⁸ Secretary of State Albright as quoted in Daalder, 91.

¹²⁹ Daalder, 212.

¹³⁰ Daalder, 19.

¹³¹ Daalder, 140.

This new plan was much more successful. The air war intensified, and appeared as if it could last indefinitely. NATO leaders prepared for a ground invasion, and Milosevic knew it. Finally Serbia lost its strongest benefactor, Russia. Michael Ignatieff writes:

Diplomacy, in other words, was just as important in changing Milosevic's mind as the air war. He gambled that Russia would support him, and that their support would cause the NATO alliance to fracture. In the event, it didn't. For all their talk of a Slavic brotherhood, the Russians decided that their ultimate national interest lay with America, not with a Balkan dictator.¹³³

Interestingly NATO did not maintain a monopoly on offensive grand strategy. Serbia's primary effort was to disable NATO with the information instrument by highlighting NATO's barbarity. At the time, NATO's leaders did not appreciate

that Milosevic could afford to lose military assets because he was not fighting with conventional military means. Instead of fighting NATO in the air, he fought NATO on the air-waves. By allowing CNN and the BBC to continue broadcasting from inside Serbia, he hoped to destabilize and unsettle Western opinion with nightly stories of civilians carbonized in bombed trains and media workers incinerated by strikes on television stations. Propaganda has been central to war since the dawn of democracy, but it took an authoritarian populist from the Balkans to understand the awesome potential for influencing the opinion-base of an enemy by manipulating modern real-time news to his own advantage.

He gambled his regime on the tenderness of Western hearts, on the assumption that the Western public would not allow an air campaign to become murderous.¹³⁴

Milosevic crafted his own asymmetric grand strategy to counter NATO's airpower and alliance. Two grand strategies competed, on the battlefield, on the air waves, and in the hearts and minds of people.

¹³² Daalder, 141.

¹³³ Ignatieff, 109-10.

¹³⁴ Ignatieff, 52.

IV. FOCUSING ON THE PEOPLE: THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

The grand strategy of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) during the 1954-62 Algerian Revolution is an excellent example of one which focused almost exclusively on the people. Algerian nationalists recognized that they could not militarily defeat and expel the French from Algeria. They also recognized that they did not need to. The FLN sought to raise France's cost of maintaining Algeria and undercut the French counter-insurgency's legitimacy in the eyes of the world, and particularly the U.S. When the effort to maintain French control of Algeria exceeded the perceived value to France, the FLN believed France would simply leave.¹³⁵

This chapter begins with a discussion of the contours of action. With a brief outline of the conflict established, four aspects of the war will be more deeply analyzed. They are: an analysis of the FLN's grand strategy, the inter-connections between the three elements of each belligerent's organic system, the degree to which the passions were inflamed and the conflict's importance as seen from each belligerent's point of view. A counter argument to test this chapter's thesis that the FLN's grand strategy focused almost entirely on France's people will be developed.

Four major external factors play important roles in the development of the Algerian Revolution. They are: the Cold War, the French war in Indochina, the era of worldwide decolonization (especially France's departure from Tunisia and Morocco) and the one hundred and fourteen years of French control over Algeria. These four factors helped shape how the Algerian revolution affected international opinion, and the conflict's importance.

A. CONTOURS OF ACTION

The Algerian revolution can be seen as a story of a colonized people attempting to liberate themselves from their colonial power, France, using a grand strategy that focused

¹³⁵ Douglas Porch, "The Algerian War (1954-1962): The Inversion of the *Levée en masse*," in Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron, eds., *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 249.

on the French people's will.¹³⁶ While bombings and unrest by disaffected Algerians pre-existed, the campaign for liberation began November 1, 1954 with a wave of coordinated "attacks on French military and police, public buildings, settler property and Muslims associated with the French administration."¹³⁷ The campaign for liberation stretched over eight years through five phases: initial Algerian successes; the French response and Battle of Algiers; the return of de Gaulle, the Challe Offensive and French military success; de Gaulle's call for an Algerian "recourse to self-determination," a defiant terrorist campaign by the *pied noir* (European settlers in Algeria) and final liberation.¹³⁸

Algeria's relationship with France began in the early 1800s. At the time there were a series of independent Muslim deys that conducted piracy against European shipping. France (among others) retaliated, crushing Algeria's dey and occupying coastal cities and villages. French colonization began in the 1840s. By 1848 Algeria was constitutionally incorporated into France and managed by the Ministry of the Interior (as opposed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which handled official colonies).¹³⁹ By 1954 there were one million Europeans and nine million Arabs and Berbers in Algeria. The Europeans owned the most profitable lands and businesses, and economic wealth was not divided proportionally between Europeans and non-Europeans. Despite several overtures to improve the lot of the non-European's lives, by 1954 little substantively had been done and the local Algerians were fed up.

The French war in Indochina reached its culminating point in 1954. France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu emboldened Algerian nationalists who thought it was the right time to step up their campaign for independence. FLN leaders planned a coordinated assault on the gendarmerie, army barracks and other symbols of French control and government. On November 1, 1954 they struck. Operating out of the Aures Mountains (an area in which French control was limited), FLN rebels fought with weapons that had

¹³⁶ Some will differ from this description of Algerian history. Dissenters highlight that Algeria in 1954 was constitutionally part of France. The nature of Algeria, however, was more similar to a colony than to France's other regions. Approximately one million Europeans occupied a position of privilege over nine million Arabs and Berbers. Arabs and Berbers were not French citizens. They were a second class of people, unable to travel freely or participate in France's electoral process.

¹³⁷ Moran, 113.

¹³⁸ Moran, 123.

¹³⁹ Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001), 10.

been “picked up in the wake of the German, Italian and Allied armies of the Second World War.”¹⁴⁰ The FLN executed seventy attacks that day, creating a sense of lawlessness throughout Algeria. As published, the goal of the FLN was to achieve:

National independence, through

(1) the restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam.

(2) the preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of race or religion.¹⁴¹

This was to be done through the “‘internationalization of the Algerian problem’ and according it the same emphasis as the struggle’s internal, military dimension.”¹⁴² Right from the beginning FLN leaders were conducting a campaign both within Algeria and in the international community.

The French response was firm but largely ineffective. Algerian leadership of the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe de Libertes Démocratiques* (M.T.L.D.) who had no role in the November 1 attacks were arrested in Algeria and France.¹⁴³ Gendarmerie forces attempted to round up FLN leadership and forces, yet heavy handed operations only served to further antagonize the Muslim population. Despite French actions, FLN forces were increasingly able to mount attacks on railway lines, ambushes and the *Beni Oui-Oius* (Muslim sympathizers).¹⁴⁴ The FLN created a campaign of brutalities in order to radicalize the Muslim population and demonstrate French inability to effectively govern. One of the most gruesome examples of FLN brutality was the massacre at Phillipeville in August 1955, “where 123 Europeans and Muslims were systematically murdered, the Muslims by having their throats cut in the manner traditionally used to butcher sheep.”¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem* (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 1961), 69.

¹⁴¹ Behr, 71.

¹⁴² Matthew Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence,” *The International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 33 (May 2001), 233.

¹⁴³ Behr, 70.

¹⁴⁴ Behr, 73.

¹⁴⁵ Moran, 115.

France responded with a massive infusion of military forces (eventually over 500,000 soldiers) and the creation of the *quadrillage* system which sought to limit support for the FLN by increasing French presence throughout the countryside. French forces were fairly successful in curtailing the FLN's freedom of action in rural areas. In response, the FLN shifted to an urban bombing campaign in Algiers. Prior to the bombing campaign in Algiers, even successful attacks (in the isolated countryside) were not reported worldwide. To win, the FLN believed they needed to increase the international visibility of the conflict and the Algiers' bombings proved very capable of doing just that.

In March 1956 France granted independence to Morocco and Tunisia, greatly impacting the Algerian conflict. By freeing two countries that many non-Frenchmen saw as very similar to Algeria, France unintentionally reinforced the legitimacy of the FLN's call for independence. The conflict escalated dramatically with the daylight murder of the mayor of Algiers, December 27, 1956.¹⁴⁶ France found this act completely unacceptable, and deployed elite Army paratroopers to reestablish order in Algiers by any means necessary. Torture became commonplace as French General Jaques Massu's paratroopers seized control.

On-scene military commanders saw such measures as necessary to achieve the pacification of Algiers, and did so without visible anguish or remorse. The Battle of Algiers was in full swing. In its course French conscripts were exposed to, or forced to participate in, torture to gain tactical intelligence. Over time these conscripts sent back to metropolitan France graphic details on the war that was being waged in their name. These methods, while militarily successful (by the time the Battle of Algiers was finished, the FLN within Algiers was totally smashed) led to a policy failure. The level of ill will amongst France's people, the U.S., and international community was incalculable. The brutality of the counter-insurgency campaign, while not exceeding the brutality of the insurgency, was so traumatic because French people and the world expected more from France than beating, near drowning and electrically shocking

¹⁴⁶ Moran, 117.

massive numbers of detainees. International worldwide condemnation, particularly in the UN led to the U.S. limiting its support to France at a time when financial, material and political support were most needed.

Internal pressures within France were tremendous. Torture and international condemnation, particularly in the UN led to the fall of the President Felix Gaillard's government and the fall of France's Fourth Republic. Charles de Gaulle was returned to power and authorized to rule by decree for six months in order to create a viable Fifth Republic and get a handle on the Algerian problem. While de Gaulle desired to have Algeria remain within the French sphere of influence, he was willing to let it go rather than risk the destruction of the newly formed Fifth Republic.

In 1959, with Algiers pacified, President de Gaulle appointed General Maurice Challe as the Commander in Chief of French forces in Algeria and ordered a coordinated west to east sweep through Algeria, dubbed the Challe Offensive, in an effort to eliminate the FLN and reestablish control over the countryside. Algeria's geography was well suited to the application of French airpower, notably helicopters and bombers, and both were used with devastating effectiveness. The offensive was spectacularly successful in military terms. Much of the country was pacified and the FLN was driven back to their original stronghold, the Aures Mountains. By now de Gaulle's government wanted to secure a *paix des braves* (peace of the brave), and allow France to retire from Algeria with honor. This ran counter to the understanding of local military commanders, who thought the Challe offensive intended to secure Algeria for France.

Even with the successes of the Challe offensive, the die had been cast. De Gaulle had already decided to grant self determination to Algeria. This greatly angered the *pied noirs*, and Army forces who had suffered so greatly fighting the FLN. General Massu, the hero of the Battle of Algiers, was relieved of his command for stating that military forces in Algeria would not accept orders to abandon Algeria. This crisis in civil-military relations intensified, culminating in April 1961 with General Challe's failed military coup. Notably, the conspirators were arrested by their own soldiers.

In a desperate maneuver, *pied noir* leaders formed their own terrorist organization, the OAS (*Organization Armée Secrète*). The OAS sought to increase

lawlessness within Algeria, in order to force France to remain and maintain order. Their campaign, while tremendously violent, failed to change de Gaulle's decision. The war continued for another year before French and FLN delegations met to discuss how to formalize France's departure. The Evian agreement, which ended the war, was signed March 18, 1961 and Algeria was free.¹⁴⁷ As part of the agreement, French forces departed over a twelve month period. While the OAS kept fighting, hoping to reverse France's departure, French forces captured the OAS' leaders and effectively suppressed the movement. French control over Algeria ended "on July 4, 1962 [when] the French Tricolour was lowered in Algeria for the first time in 132 years as High Commissioner Fouchet, the last of Frances's all-powerful pro-counsels, left for home."¹⁴⁸

B. ANALYSIS OF GRAND STRATEGY

The primary target of the FLN's grand strategy was the will of the French people. The FLN believed that if French society's support for the counter-insurgency eroded, the people would pressure their government to withdraw from Algeria. The FLN recognized the French government, *on its own*, would pay almost any price to maintain Algeria within France. The key for the FLN was to develop levers that could effect the government's decisions. The French people became that lever.

In 1954, FLN leadership believed that "Algeria was a tinderbox of Muslim anger, [and] a few explosives would detonate an insurrectional *levée* [call to arms]."¹⁴⁹ The FLN began their war November 1, with a series of spectacular terrorist attacks and a declaration of independence from French colonial rule, believing it would be the match to light the tinderbox. FLN leaders expected Algerian Muslims to immediately rise up and

¹⁴⁷ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954- 1962* (New York, Penguin Books, 1979), 520.

¹⁴⁸ Horne, 533.

¹⁴⁹ Porch, 236.

swiftly kick the French oppressors out of Algeria. They were wrong. While many Algerians were unhappy with French rule, most wanted to improve the situation while staying within the French system.

The declaration of independence captured the imagination of some members of French society, the U.S. and the Third World, however. The FLN sought to establish legitimacy for its resistance to French colonialism using the diplomatic and informational instruments of power. As part of this effort, the FLN established a government in exile in Tunisia with a corresponding army, the *Armée de Libération Nationale* (ALN). The exiled government and ALN dramatically improved the perceived legitimacy of the FLN and undercut France's position that the FLN was a marginal group without a sizable base of support. Diplomatically the FLN tried to frame its struggle in terms with the UN charter, which established self determination as a universal right. Framing their struggle as one of national liberation, in line with the UN charter, resonated with many around the world, including: Western intellectuals, Third World Nations and the Non-aligned Movement. By rendering Algeria ungovernable, and given that by 1954 the FLN would accept nothing less than French withdrawal, France fought fire with fire. France's reaction further validated many peoples' beliefs about colonial oppression and brutality.

Unable to affect the French government directly and ill equipped to fight the French Army in Algeria, the FLN fought against Muslim sympathizers.¹⁵⁰ Symbolically, killing moderate Muslim supporters demonstrated the lack of French authority in Algeria. Practically, it deprived France the support it needed to conduct an effective counter-insurgency. Within the first two and a half years of the war "an estimated 6,353 Muslims were assassinated by the FLN, compared to only 1,035 Europeans."¹⁵¹ Killing fellow Muslims was much easier than attacking French military forces, and proved more effective.

Attempts by the FLN to project its fighting power beyond Algeria were largely unsuccessful. A bombing campaign within continental France did little more than get the

¹⁵⁰ The FLN did attack the gendarmerie and military units within Algeria, when favorable circumstances presented themselves.

¹⁵¹ Porch, 248.

conspirators captured. The FLN recognized that it could never defeat the French military and seize control of Algeria. Lacking the means to settle the matter definitely, the FLN simply influenced France, through her people, until France withdrew.




Figure 9. A Depiction of the Belligerents' Grand Strategies.

C. INTER-CONNECTIONS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS

The French military-government (M-G) connection was marked by the role of professionalism and conscription within, and the government's control over, the military. Among the French, professionalism within the military was assumed to lead to greater discipline, including following lawful orders. As on-scene commanders began to suspect that the ordered sacrifices were not intended to preserve Algeria within France, but simply a form of bargaining in pursuit of compromise, they began to openly challenge political decisions. Acts of treason like Challe's 1959 failed coup further eroded the legitimacy of the French government. Conscription also greatly affected the government. Conscripts were the ones which described torturing prisoners to France's people who in turn influenced the government. Interestingly, the conscript force was better able to stop

General Challe's military coup. They were more in touch with traditional forms of civilian-military relations and less connected to the French military's wartime sacrifices.

The government-people (G-P) connection in France was greatly effected by the introduction of conscription. With over half a million soldiers in Algeria (out of a population of 42 million), many millions of Frenchmen personally knew soldiers involved in the war. Soldiers home on leave told stories of how the war was being conducted, and were directly exposed to French public opinion. France's G-P connection also included the connection between the Muslim sympathizers who were being brutally murdered by the FLN. Arabs and Berbers were not French citizens and had a weaker voice in setting governmental priorities. This likely contributed to the French government not fully protecting these sympathizers and instead focusing on killing and/or capturing FLN members.

Among the Algerians, the G-P connection was marked by the two main groups which comprised the FLN's people: active and passive supporters. Active supporters hid fighters and leaders in safe houses, and provided them food and clothing. Passive, though involved, supporters were just as important and much more numerous. They supplied the active supporters with tactical intelligence on French activities and provisions destined for FLN fighters and leaders. France's inability to sever the FLN's G-P connection marks one of their key failures in their counter-insurgency effort.

The French people-military (P-M) connection had a critical affect on the Algerian Revolution. In France the call to conscription significantly strengthened the P-M connection, leading to a higher degree of what Gil Merom termed "instrumental dependence." Merom described "instrumental dependence" as the degree to which the state relies on society to "provide the resources, mostly manpower, needed to execute national security policies."¹⁵² With half a million Frenchmen in Algeria, most not of their own free will, the people of France were very interested in how the war was carried out. The rejection of, and disgust for, the practice of torture, written about by leading intellectuals had a particularly poisonous effect on the moral of forces fighting in Algeria.

¹⁵² Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18.

Many of the French soldiers had radios, and received uncensored news and opinion, exposing them to French and world criticism.

The Algerian M-P connection played a major role in the war's conduct. Much of the FLN's violence was directed at moderate Muslims, and sought to destroy the moderates' presence and radicalizing the populous. As a small insurgent/terrorist group, the FLN had to be very careful to maintain the existence of and support from their own people. Direct support was especially strong in the Aures Mountains (militarily and economically), Algiers (militarily and economically) and in Tunisia (diplomatically and informationally). Indirect support was strong in the Arab world (particularly in the governments of Tunisia and Egypt), the Soviet Union and the Third World. Direct support from Algerian people gave the FLN needed assistance to carry out their campaign. Indirect support gave the FLN legitimacy, critical for their morale, and weakened France's alliances. Insurgent and terrorist successes and the continuous presence of fighting forces within Algeria and Tunisia gave the FLN people confidence that they could win. The ALN in Tunisia is a case in point of the positive effects of a military force in being. To counter the ALN, French forces built the Morice Line, a land-mined and electrified fence fortification, garrisoned by 80,000 soldiers.¹⁵³ By defending against a possible ALN invasion, these 80,000 French soldiers could not assist the overall counter-insurgency. Diplomatically and informationally, France was unable to counter the ALN as well. While French forces did keep the ALN out of Algeria, they could not keep international journalists from going to Tunisia where they saw the 'brave liberation forces' that were defending Algeria's right to independence and national self determination. The ALN was an international public relations disaster for France.

¹⁵³ Moran, 120.




Figure 10. A Summary of the Inter-Element Connections.

D. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT'S LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND PASSION

In 1954, French emotions about Algeria were inflamed. Forceful rhetoric held that maintaining Algeria was of the highest importance to France. This mindset and the long ties to Algeria led the government, military and people to resist Algerian calls for independence. France was still recovering from the stinging 1940 defeat by Germany and recent setbacks in Indochina. Although proved to be a delusional exaggeration, at the time maintaining Algeria was seen as absolutely vital to the existence of France.

France saw their security “as no longer depending on the Rhine or the Elbe, but rather running along an axis from the Mediterranean through Algiers to Brazzaville in the French Congo.”¹⁵⁴ France argued to NATO that “Algeria represented, with England, one of the ‘two essential platforms upon which the military readiness rests,’” against a possible Soviet invasion of Europe.¹⁵⁵ A common perception held at the time was that if France was to be a Great Power again she had to have possessions and colonies and Algeria was the keystone. Not only did France argue that Algeria was necessary to

¹⁵⁴ Wall, 21.

¹⁵⁵ Wall, 21.

defend against a Soviet invasion across Europe, but later France to describe its counter-insurgency campaign as anti-communist, that “if France abandoned Algeria the result would be communist domination of all of North Africa.”¹⁵⁶ By describing the Algerian counter-insurgency with such extreme rhetoric it is no surprise that French leaders and the people’s passions were inflamed. Frenchmen saw Algeria as France, maintained by the Interior Ministry with a population of one million European *pied noirs*. Algeria had been a part of France as long as Texas had been a part of America. A statement by General Valluy, the French representative to NATO’s standing group, shows just how far the passions were inflamed: “for France to stay in North Africa was a matter of ‘life and death’ for the French people.”¹⁵⁷ Almost all of France it seems was caught in the grip of “colonial consensus according to which the loss of empire meant French decline and eventual decadence, a consensus that was shared in mitigated form even by the Communist Party.”¹⁵⁸

The passions of Algerians were split. The FLN’s rhetoric was just as passionate as the early French rhetoric; however they were a near microscopic minority. The FLN was not a mass revolutionary movement in Maoist terms, but rather an “underground organization.”¹⁵⁹ The bulk of Muslims wanted some measure of improvement but did not see independence as the only solution to what they saw as an unjust French colonization. Some Muslims favored the French government. Faced with a general apathy, the FLN assassinated moderate Muslim leaders and publicized French brutalities. In doing so they sought to radicalize the Muslim population and increase the support for their cause.

As viewed through the lens of importance, the war was of vital importance to the FLN (who would all face long jail sentences, or execution, if the revolution failed), and not very vital to France (regardless of the rhetoric). The French were fighting for pride (because they had been humbled in 1940 and the loss of Indochina), and because some had convinced themselves that Algeria was critical to their survival as a Great Power. This is a completely different perspective than the FLN faced. Once the FLN declared

¹⁵⁶ Wall, 24.

¹⁵⁷ Wall, 23.

¹⁵⁸ Wall, 25.

¹⁵⁹ Moran, 110.

Algeria's independence, there was no way for them to stay in Algeria unless the French were ejected. Critical to understanding the question of importance is to examine the myth of Algeria as a part of France.

French colonization of Algeria began in the 1830s, however in 1848 a decree was passed that declared Algeria to be an integral part of France, no different from other regions in France. Algeria was administered as three departments: Constantine, Algiers and Oran, just as the rest of France was administered as departments. Over the years European colonists flowed into Algeria. By 1954 there were one million European settlers and nine million Berbers and Arabs. There were numerous social differences that separated Algeria from 'real' continental France, however. One of the most egregious was that ethnic non-Europeans were classed as French nationals, as opposed to the ethnic Europeans who were French citizens. Citizens could vote in national elections and travel freely throughout France. French nationals could not.

Algeria was in effect a colony, albeit one with an exceptional emotional attachment. Despite the rhetoric, continental France could (and did) survive without Algeria. Seen in such clear terms, it is not surprising that the FLN placed a higher value on the conflict's outcome and that France would leave when the cost became too great.

E. COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

Another way to look at the FLN's grand strategy is to focus on the French government. It could be argued that a two step process where the FLN affects the French people and the people influence the government only confuses already difficult analysis. There is a point here. Getting the French people to oppose the Algerian Revolution was only successful because they helped change the government's policy. In reply to this criticism, if the model used does not place a strong emphasis on the role of the people, leaders may minimize the role of the people in victory or defeat and instead focus on the government and the military.

F. FINAL THOUGHTS

The French government and people were determined to put down the Algerian rebellion and regain their honor lost after the 1940 defeat to Germany and the withdrawal from Indochina. France should have heeded the warnings of the Indochinese experience however. In Indochina, Frenchmen were sent to kill and die to maintain a colonial legacy. Professional soldiers will likely perform such missions, conscripts may not. In Algeria, as the number of dead rose, public support waned. Through eight years of fighting, it is estimated that between 25,000 to 30,000 French soldiers and officers were killed in Algeria (more than twice the number of deaths per capita as the U.S. lost in eight years in Vietnam).¹⁶⁰

In fighting the FLN, France levied a draft and eventually there were half a million Frenchmen in Algeria. Conscription strengthened and broadened the people-military connection. Because much of France personally knew the people fighting in Algeria, the people felt personally connected to the conflict and thus more likely to express dissent (and more confident when they did). To turn a popular phrase on its head: with taxation comes representation. Frenchmen were taxed for bodies (as conscripts) and money (as taxes). After being taxed for the war, the French people felt justified to lobby the government about how the war was being fought and when to end it. As body bags and tales of torture came home, the idea of keeping Algeria part of constitutional France wore thin. Many in the French government still wanted to maintain Algeria as a French possession, but the rose colored glasses turned clear. Frenchmen were angered about the loss of French life and the use of torture as part of the counter-insurgency. As some of the French dissenters had been tortured by Germans during WWII, their voices had a strong moral authority, and deeply affected popular opinion.

Eventually the Algerian revolution was seen as a conflict between people who wanted to be free of their colonial overlords and those who wanted to maintain a status quo of oppression. This narrative dramatically undercut French counter-insurgency efforts, both in Algeria and in metropolitan France. France was also hindered by a lack of international support, notably by the United States. The lack of international support was a product of, and cause for, dissent within France. With a society repelled by the use

¹⁶⁰ Merom, 87.

of torture, and unwilling to deploy more soldiers to Algeria, France could not resolve the internal contradictions of her situation. France could not suppress the Algerian Revolution with military force and the time had long past when non-military means could have offered a solution. Internationally isolated, France's actions were seen as illegitimate colonial oppression to maintain an oppressed territory. Rather than continue the war and further damage the Fifth Republic, and realizing that neither military force nor the other instruments of national power could bring peace, France began negotiations with the FLN in 1961.

In the Algerian Revolution, it appears that French leaders did not appreciate the ability of France's people to turn against the war until it was too late. If they had, perhaps France would have worked harder to maintain national morale. As it turned out, France's own actions exacerbated the problem. France was unprepared to recognize or resist the FLN's grand strategy that focused on France's people. Instead France focused on killing FLN insurgents, notably in the battle of Algiers and the Challe offensive. Torture in the Battle of Algiers while militarily successful was a grand-strategic failure of the highest magnitude, and directly led to many French people turning against the war.

Comparing war to cards, if the only near term action that can be taken leads to long term defeat, better to not fight and fold the hand. A losing hand should definitely not be played if able to play another hand, with the potential for better cards. If a better hand is not possible, better to consider leaving the table. There are few times one has to stay at the table and play cards. France in Algeria was not one of them.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. CONCLUSION

The cartographic expedition is complete; three wars have been surveyed and results analyzed. What has been gained? Hopefully some aspects of grand strategy's *terra incognita* have been charted, with its depths sounded, shoal waters and ocean currents identified.¹⁶¹ We started this expedition with a short yet robust definition of grand strategy: "the [coordination] and [direction of] all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war - the goal defined by fundamental policy."¹⁶² From that definition a symmetric, non-deterministic model was developed by inductively linking the 'people, government, military' description of a belligerent with the instruments of national power, along with importance, passions and the international system.

Applying the Instrument-Element Model to three disparate wars helped identify the ways belligerents affect each other. Importantly, the case studies establish that focusing on any element of an adversary's organic system can lead to victory. The case studies accounted for a wide variety of grand strategies, as well as varied types of wars. A war for national liberation, a conventional interstate war fought over territory, and a police action conducted by an overwhelming alliance against a single, small nation, by no means exhaust the variability of war. Yet the cases are sufficiently diverse to suggest the Instrument-Element Model has broad utility to assist leaders as they face crises and war.

A. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis confirms that successful grand strategies can focus on the people, the government or the military. Belligerents should specifically defend each of their three elements from enemy attack, whether in the form of military force or the non-military instruments of power. Variations in grand strategies and types of war did not prohibit parsing the belligerents into constituent elements and considering which instruments of national power were used on each element. When necessary, modifications to help

¹⁶¹ Respects to Captain Wayne P. Hughes. See: Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. U.S. Navy (Retired), *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Second Edition* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2000), 310.

¹⁶² Hart, 322.

analysis can easily be made, such as adding the subset “Muslim Sympathizers” to France’s people when looking at the Algerian Revolution. The symmetry and non-determinism of the Instrument-Element Model should help leaders craft a grand strategy with offensive and defensive components.

Accounting for variations in importance proved one of the model’s strongest points. Defining seven levels of importance, without tying them to specific issues, is a vast improvement over imprecise gradations like: “vital,” “important” and “humanitarian” which have been used to define U.S. national interests.¹⁶³ Interestingly, it was noted that belligerents may change how they see a conflict’s importance. Changes in importance occurred in the 1967 War (Arab states) and the 1999 Kosovo War (NATO). In the 1967 War, the Arab states downgraded the war’s importance in response to their sudden military defeat. NATO increased the importance it placed on the Kosovo War when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) did not quickly capitulate and defied NATO’s demands.

This thesis also found that not all elements within a single belligerent will necessarily agree on a war’s importance. In the second half of the Algerian Revolution, the French people, and the military leadership doing the fighting in Algeria, held dramatically different opinions on the war’s importance. This difference contributed to a crisis in civil-military relations that could have brought down the government. Leaders should strive to get and keep their people, government and military in agreeing on a conflict’s importance.

This thesis showed that opponents often differed in their estimation of a war’s importance. In the 1967 War, the Arab states considered the war significantly important (once pre-war hysteria wore off). Israel considered the war critically important. The F.R.Y. considered the Kosovo War vitally important. At first, NATO considered the war significantly important. Importance escalated to major when NATO believed the F.R.Y.’s continued defiance threatened its existence and/or its future credibility to issue coercive threats. The FLN considered the Algerian Revolution critically important, for France it was vital.

¹⁶³ P. H. Liotta, “Still Worth Dying For: National Interests and the Nature of Strategy,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 2, (Spring, 2003), 130.

The cases showed that the passions, like importance, can change during war. Prior to the 1967 War, the Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian and Iraqi people, government and military yearned for war. They lined the streets in the thousands watching their armies march off to war. Nasser said they would fight until the last man, to wipe Israel off the map. After their dramatic military defeat, there was no more cheering, no more clamoring and no desire to keep fighting. The passions for war evaporated. Although not shown in the three cases, it is also possible that the passions could grow as well. Such elevations of passions would probably result from an enemy's inhumane act, which could lead to righteous indignation.

The three cases showed that, at any point in time, not all elements are equally vulnerable to each instrument of national power.¹⁶⁴ An element's vulnerability can change through a crisis. Once a government has decided to go to war, it will be very resistant to the information instrument, particularly if not used in conjunction with more coercive instruments. Diplomacy and information remain critical even late in a war, both to undercut the enemy's support and to maintain one's own internal and international support. As Britain's Ministry of Defense reports:

Information was also important in our campaign against Milosevic. In many ways getting our messages across in the broadcast and written media was as crucial as the military campaign. It was vital to keep public opinion properly informed... We needed to cut through Milosevic's propaganda and control of broadcast outlets in Kosovo and Serbia to let people know the truth, and to let an informed public decide what was right.¹⁶⁵

The information instrument helped maintain internal support for the war and kept the NATO alliance intact.

This thesis finds that grand-strategically, words matter. The rhetoric that policy makers use to inflame their people's passions can later constrain a government's options. Rhetoric intended for an internal audience gets heard by external audiences. President

¹⁶⁴ It is believed, however, that each instrument of national power can effect each element under the right conditions.

¹⁶⁵ UK Ministry of Defense, *Kosovo Lessons from the Crisis: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defense by Command of Her Majesty*, (London, The Stationary Office, June 2000), 27.

Clinton said to America: “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war,” and the F.R.Y. received the message that the U.S. (and by extension NATO) was not serious about fighting for Kosovo.¹⁶⁶

B. AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

1. Develop Additional Case Studies Involving Unconventional Belligerents

The U.S. is actively fighting two counter-insurgencies (Afghanistan and Iraq) and a world-wide counter-terrorist campaign (Al Qaeda). Developing case studies, using the Instrument-Element Model, of successful and failed terror and counter-terror campaigns, insurgencies and counter-insurgencies could provide much-needed insights. As unconventional belligerents can be described with the three elements of the organic system and do fit within the Instrument-Element Model, it is expected that the same three fundamental grand strategies of focusing on the people, government or military do apply in counter-insurgency/counter-terrorist conflicts. Future case studies could confirm or deny this supposition.

2. Develop Case Studies Where Non-Military Instruments of Power Play a Predominant Role

Developing case studies where the non-military instruments of national power play a predominant role would most likely develop new insights as to how non-military power can achieve policy results. Current economic power seems to be limited to: favored trade status, sanctions and embargos. It is suspected that more options exist than have been identified.¹⁶⁷ Additionally the methods by which information is transformed into power remain unclear.

3. Further Refine the Instrument-Element Model

Further research could refine the Instrument-Element Model. As the cases were developed, additional types of interactions between belligerents became clear. Foremost of these is the attempt to attack the inter-element linkages directly. At the strategic, operational and tactical levels such connections may refer to physical devices linking the

¹⁶⁶ Daalder, 130.

¹⁶⁷ Cyber attacks on stock markets and flooding the enemy with tremendous amounts of counterfeit currency come immediately to mind. Even if one side rejects such methods, it should be wary of an adversary who might not self-impose such limits.

three elements of society. Grand-strategically, the connections are primarily intangible. There is no grand-strategic switching station that belligerents can bomb to disconnect the people from their government. Further study can reveal how to sever the three inter-element connections, at the grand-strategic level, and how doing so would affect a war effort.

Another interaction that belligerents do target, but was not reflected in the Instrument-Element Model, is how adversaries work directly to effect the international system (for their benefit), and to limit their adversary from doing the same. In the Kosovo War, NATO sought to limit the F.R.Y.'s influence within the UN and tried to get the UN Security Council to authorize military force. As the Instrument-Element Model is depicted now, it appears to passively receive inputs from and effect belligerents. A refined model would show belligerents deliberately attempting to effect parts of the international system and blocking such attempts by their adversaries.

A refined model could look at creating a separate index for will among the three elements. Nations do sometimes go to war without inflamed passions.¹⁶⁸ This point was excellently illustrated by Colonel Harry Summers in his analysis of the Vietnam War, *On Strategy*. Summers writes:

The student draft deferments, along with the decision not to ask for a declaration of war and not to mobilize our reserve forces, were part of a deliberate Presidential policy not to arouse the passions of the American people. The effect of this was that we fought the Vietnam War *in cold blood*.¹⁶⁹

Wars are fought in cold blood, as NATO did in Kosovo. The next generation of Instrument-Element Model, should index will and better reflect cold blooded wars. How the passions relate to will is also worthy of study. It is suspected that in wars of passion where the passions evaporate, there will be a corresponding drop in will, which happened among the Arabs in the 1967 War. Future case studies could focus on wars where will and passions play a prominent role, and analyze the connections between them.

¹⁶⁸ Discussion with Professor Richard M. Brown, Professor, Naval War College. (Monterey, August, 2005).

¹⁶⁹ Summers, 35.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis recommends three changes to the way our Republic thinks about and fights wars. The recommendations are:

- Formally recognize the grand-strategic level of war.
- Formally recognize national policy as a level of war.
- Formally recognize ethical power as an instrument of national power.

1. Formally Recognize the Grand-Strategic Level of War

The grand-strategic level of war should be formally recognized because it affects, and is influenced, by the recognized levels of war. As this thesis has shown, it is not a separate, unchanging plan for war. Within the U.S. military, the levels of war are formally defined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Differentiating war into specific levels intends:

From a doctrinal perspective, [to] clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the **three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical**.¹⁷⁰ [emphasis as written]

Doctrine for Joint Operations goes on to discuss the levels of war individually. Unfortunately the definition for the strategic level of warfare merges aspects of military strategy and grand strategy. It says:

The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. [essentially B. H. Liddell Hart's 1967 definition of grand strategy]

Military strategy, derived from policy, provides a framework for conducting operations.¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ *Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0*, ix.

¹⁷¹ *Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0*, II-2.

As this quotation shows, within the same section, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* encompasses the traditional definition of strategy, which it terms ‘military strategy,’ while at the same time encompassing properly recognized grand strategy.

Unfortunately, this doctrinal confusion is compounded. *Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, which is intended to be the capstone for all joint publications, opens with General Henry H. Shelton’s letter of introduction.¹⁷² The General writes: “[*Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*] also includes an expanded scope that bridges the gap among the **national, strategic, and operational levels** [emphasis added].”¹⁷³ Later, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* contradicts the general, saying the three levels of war are: “strategic, operational [and] tactical.”¹⁷⁴ *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* does once mention grand strategy, but only to say it is synonymous with ‘national strategy.’ After this one mention of ‘national strategy,’ neither it nor grand strategy are mentioned again.¹⁷⁵

With all this doctrinal confusion, what have theorists written about the levels of war? In his book, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, noted historian Paul Kennedy proposes that there are four relevant levels: “political, strategic, operational [and] tactical.”¹⁷⁶ Colonel John A. Warden III’s book, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat*, recognizes four levels of war: “grand strategic, strategic, operational, and tactical.”¹⁷⁷ B. H. Liddell Hart’s *Strategy* recognizes three levels, grand-strategic, strategic and tactical, writing: “As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane,

¹⁷² General Henry H. Shelton was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.

¹⁷³ *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1*, (Washington, D.C., The Joint Staff, 14 November 2000), Letter of introduction by General Henry H. Shelton.

¹⁷⁴ Strategic, Operational and Tactical are the “traditionally understood” three levels of war as defined in U.S. doctrine. See: *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1*, III-10.

¹⁷⁵ *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1*, III-9.

¹⁷⁶ Paul Kennedy, 5.

¹⁷⁷ Colonel John A. Warden III, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1988), 3.

so strategy is an application on a lower plane of ‘grand strategy.’”¹⁷⁸ Kennedy, Warden and Hart all agree that there is a level of war above strategy. Formally recognizing the grand-strategic level of war acknowledges that although “‘military strategy’ and ‘grand strategy’ are interrelated, [they] are by no means synonymous... Grand strategy *controls* military strategy, which is one of its elements.”¹⁷⁹ Grand strategy controls strategy just as strategy controls operations. As the strategic level of war is distinct from the operational level, so too is the grand-strategic level distinct from the strategic level of war. As the case studies showed, belligerents fought on the grand-strategic level of war. They made attacks and defended against attacks, not solely military attacks, but integrated multi-instrument campaigns. By not formally recognizing the grand-strategic level of war, leaders likely overlook this critical linkage that connects policy goals with the integrated strategy for the instruments of national power.

2. Formally Recognize National Policy as a Level of War

Policy needs to be recognized as a level of war, for the same reason grand strategy should be recognized. Policy goals affect, and are influenced by, the currently recognized levels of war. Policy can and does change during a war’s course as the cases in this thesis showed. Initially the F.R.Y.’s policy was to maintain control of Kosovo, but after suffering defeats at the grand-strategic and strategic levels of war, they shifted their policy to not being invaded and maintaining control of Serbia.

Although transitioning from three levels of war to five may seem like added complexity, it actually simplifies all levels of war planning, because it recognizes what currently exists yet remains unacknowledged. Lower echelon forces will be able to look to grand-strategic planning and see what its defined goals are. By understanding the importance (and detailed planning) of non-military instruments, unit level military commanders will be better able to employ their forces, so as to avoid a grand-strategic or policy debacle. *Doctrine for Joint Operations* recognizes the possibility “that in a world

¹⁷⁸ In 1967 when B. H. Liddell Hart wrote *Strategy*, the identification of the operational level of war was not widely in use by English speaking theorists. It was in wide use among continental states however, Germany and Russia particularly, since the 1930s. The United States adopted the idea of an operational level of war in 1982. See: Hart, 321.

¹⁷⁹ John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices*, (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1973), 14-15.

of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels [of war].”¹⁸⁰ Defining five levels of war helps make this point clear, and begins to develop the vocabulary and mental models needed to better conduct warfare grand-strategically. When considering updating the levels of war it is important to remember that it was not until 1982 and the Army’s *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* that U.S. military doctrine acknowledged the existence of the operational level of war.¹⁸¹ The levels of war are not unchanging truths, but have been updated over time to reflect a continually refined understanding of war.




Figure 11. The Five Levels of War.

3. Formally Recognize Ethical Power as an Instrument of National Power

The various dimensions of ethical power require more formal theoretical recognition. Every time a belligerent acts in a manner contrary to its own internal values it has the potential to undercut the cohesion and will of its people, military and government. It also emboldens the enemy who highlights the unethical behavior using the information instrument of power. The enemy directs the information instrument at: the enemy’s own supporters (to rally support), the international system (to isolate the unethical belligerent from allies), and the unethical belligerent, (to reduce its internal support for the war). President Milosevic understood the ethical instrument of power and used it during the Kosovo War:

¹⁸⁰ *Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, II-2.*

¹⁸¹ *Field Manual-100-5 Operations*, (Washington, D.C., Headquarters Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), v.

Instead of fighting NATO in the air, he fought NATO on the air-waves. By allowing CNN and the BBC to continue broadcasting from inside Serbia, he hoped to destabilize and unsettle Western opinion with nightly stories of civilians carbonized in bombed trains and media workers incinerated by strikes on television stations.¹⁸²

His effort failed, but not without disturbing many people who did pressure the governments of NATO's member states. Milosevic's efforts to portray NATO's acts as unethical were of course dramatically undercut by the F.R.Y.'s own brutal, unethical behavior. When acting in a manner contrary to the *adversary's* ethical values, on the other hand, a belligerent can dramatically strengthen the enemy's will and passions.

In 1967 B. H. Liddell identified ethical power in his book *Strategy* when he described the integration which forms grand strategy. He wrote:

Fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponents will. A good cause is a sword as well as armor. Likewise, chivalry in war can be a most effective weapon in weakening the opponent's will to resist, as well as augmenting moral strength.¹⁸³

Ethical Action	Likely effect
Contrary to one's own ethics	Likely to undercut internal support
	Perceptions of hypocrisy may lead to a loss of allied support and/or isolation from the international system
	Perceptions of hypocrisy may bolster enemy will
Contrary to the enemy's ethics	Likely to bolster enemy will
Contrary to an ally's ethics	May lose the ally's support
Contrary to generally accepted international norms	May lead to international isolation

Table 2. Ethical Actions and Their Likely Effects.

¹⁸² Ignatieff, 52.

¹⁸³ Hart, 322.

Looking at ethical power requires looking from another's viewpoint. Actions that one adversary may consider ethical, may be considered unethical by another nation, global public opinion or the enemy. Taking such an action may be the right choice, but if so, leaders should pause and consider the potentially significant consequences, and mitigate them as possible.

Ethical power is distinct from legality, although there is a degree of overlap. Leaders should not solely rely on advice from lawyers, but seek commonsense opinions as well, particularly from those knowledgeable of relevant international sensitivities. Bombing Belgrade's TV station during the Kosovo War may have been legal under international law, but many within the F.R.Y. and the international system considered it unethical because the harm it inflicted on civil society was perceived as disproportionate to the strategic benefit gained. A significant backlash occurred. Hopefully policy makers had balanced the possible gain of knocking Radio Television Serbia off the air for six hours against the potential informational, diplomatic and ethical backlash. In light of the importance of ethical power, current efforts to increase U.S. cultural intelligence and understand how others may perceive our actions are of the utmost importance and should be lauded.

Ultimately, as Liddell Hart said, a good cause and chivalry in war are the essence of ethical power. Ethical power should be recognized an "instrument of policy" in its own right, if only to emphasize its importance. By not formally identifying ethical power, nations run the risk of overlooking it.

D. DROPPING ANCHOR¹⁸⁴

As this thesis comes to a close, it is right to return to the subject of mental models. Absent the formal recognition and discussion of grand strategy, the grand-strategic and policy levels of war and ethical power as an instrument of national power, a leader's mental models will likely lack the vocabulary to think and fight in an integrated way. When writing about the Kosovo War, Michael Ignatieff wrote that Western leaders did not "appreciate that Milosevic could afford to lose military assets because he was not

¹⁸⁴ Hughes, 310.

fighting with conventional military means.”¹⁸⁵ Is that because doctrine and thought did not encompass grand strategy and the ethical instrument of power? Certainly we have the opportunity to ensure that we are mentally prepared for future conflicts.

With sound policy, grand strategy should be the lynchpin of success. Integrating the instruments of national power, “the policies and armaments of the nation [ensures] that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.”¹⁸⁶ This thesis has attempted to begin charting what B. H. Liddell Hart rightly identified as *terra incognita*. A model has been developed, case studies analyzed, conclusions drawn and recommendations made. Hopefully the study of grand strategy will continue, leaders will formally recognize and use ethical power, and the inner workings of the grand-strategic level of war will be identified as has been largely done for the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.

¹⁸⁵ Ignatieff, 52.

¹⁸⁶ Edward Meade Earle et al., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, ed. by Edward Meade Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), viii. See also: Kennedy, 2.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bailey, Sydney D. *Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process* (London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1990).
- Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaccov. *Israel, The Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East* (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1987).
- Barker, A. J. *Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York, Hippocrene Books, 1981).
- Behr, Edward. *The Algerian Problem* (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 1961).
- Cable, James. *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1971, rev. ed. 1994).
- Claire, Rodger W. *Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb* (New York, Broadway Books, 2004).
- Clark, General Wesley K., U.S. Army (Retired). *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat* (New York, PublicAffairs Books, 2001).
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, trans. Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984).
- Collins, John M. *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1973).
- Connelly, Matthew. "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence." *The International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 33 (May 2001).
- Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Art of Operations* (Lanham, University Press of America, 1987).
- Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo* (Westport, Praeger Publishers, 2001).
- Daalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
- Department of Defense, *Report to Congress: Kosovo / Allied Force After-Action Report* (Washington, D.C., January 31, 2000), 23.

Department of State, *Kosovo Chronology: Timeline of events 1989-1999 relating to the crisis in Kosovo* (Washington, D.C., May 21, 1999), 23. Available online at: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_kosovo_timeline.html. Accessed: September 1, 2005.

Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C., The Joint Staff, 10 September 2001), I-6.

Earle, Edward Meade et al. *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* ed. by Edward Meade Earle (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944).

Field Manual-100-5 Operations (Washington, D.C., Headquarters-Department of the Army, 14 June 1993).

Flint, Roy K., Peter W. Kozumplik and Thomas J. Waraksa, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, The Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War* (Wayne, Avery Publishing Group, 1987).

Gartner, Dr. Scott Sigmund. Lectures: “*Strategic Assessment in War*” and “*How Measuring Success in War Leads to Failure*,” (Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School, August, 26, 2005).

Hammel, Eric. *Six Days in June: how Israel won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War* (New York, Scribner's, 1992).

Hart, B. H. Liddell. *Strategy 2nd revised edition* (London, Meridian, Published by the Penguin Group, 1991).

Heggoy, Alf Andrew. *Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Algeria* (London, Indiana University Press, 1972).

Herzog, Chaim. *The Arab-Israeli wars: War and Peace in the Middle East* (New York, Random House, 1982).

Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954- 1962* (New York, Penguin Books, 1979).

Hughes, Jr., Captain Wayne P., U.S. Navy (Retired), *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat Second Edition* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2000).

Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw. *Revolutionary Terrorism: the FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Stanford, Hoover University Press, 1978).

Ignatieff, Michael. *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York, Metropolitan Books, 2000).

Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, D.C., The Joint Staff, 14 November 2000), I-6.

Kennedy, Paul, et al., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* ed. by Paul Kennedy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1991).

Lambeth, Benjamin S. *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: a Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica, Rand, 2001).

Leonhard, Robert. *The Art of Maneuver* (Novato, Presidio Press, 1991).

Lind, William S. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Bolder, Westview Press, 1985).

Liotta, P. H. "Still Worth Dying For: National Interests and the Nature of Strategy," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 2. (Spring, 2003).

Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York, New York University Press, 1998).

Merom, Gil. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Moran, Daniel. *Wars of National Liberation* (London, Cassell, 2001).

Nardulli, Bruce R. et al., *Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo* (Santa Monica, RAND, 2002).

NATO Handbook (Belgium, NATO Office of Information and Press 2001).

Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, The Compact. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1991).

Peters, John E. et al. *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force* (Santa Monica, RAND, 2001).

Porch, Douglas. "The Algerian War (1954-1962): The Inversion of the *Levée en masse*," in Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron, eds., *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Public Broadcasting Service, *Online News Hour: Targeting Serb TV* (April 23, 1999). Accessed: September 1, 2005. Available online at:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour.bb.europe/jan-jun999/serb_tv_4-23.html.

Summers Jr., Colonel Harry G. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York, Ballantine Books, 1982).

- Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War* trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971).
- Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War* trans. Lionel Giles (1910), ed. by James Clavell (New York, Delacorte Press, 1983).
- UK Ministry of Defense, *Kosovo Lessons from the Crisis: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defense by Command of Her Majesty* (London, The Stationary Office, June 2000), 23.
- van Creveld, Martin. *The sword and the Olive: a critical history of the Israeli defense force* (New York, Public Affairs, 1998).
- Warden III, Colonel John A. *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1988).
- Warden III, Colonel John A. "The Enemy as a System," *Airpower Journal* 9, 2 (Spring, 1995), 3. Accessed: September 1, 2005. Available online at: <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/warden.html>.
- Wall, Irwin M. *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001).
- The White House. 2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. (Washington, D.C., The White House, September 17, 2002).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California